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THE MORAL HAZARD PROBLEM WITH PRIVATIZATION
OF PUBLIC ENFORCEMENT: THE CASE OF
PHARMACEUTICAL FRAUD
Dayna Bowen Matthew*
This Article takes a law and economics approach to exploring some of the costs that
arise when governments rely on private enforcement to accomplish the goals of public
law. The analysis focuses on qui tam enforcement under the Civil False Claims Act,
because a remarkable body of empirical data demonstrates the expansive role private
qui tam relators are playing in enforcing Medicare and Medicaid fraud and abuse
laws. The Article further focuses on the application of these laws to the pharmaceuti-
cal industry. This focus is enlightening because the Government, as well as private
enforcers have recently targeted this industry so that emerging legal trends in private
enforcement are readily evident. The economic concept of moral hazard-a well-
recognized theory that a person takes more risks and exercises less care when insured
than she would if uninsured-is applied to reconceptualize the costs and benefits of
private enforcement. These costs are most dramatic when, as in the case of pharma-
ceutical fraud, the government overwhelmingly cedes to private enforcers its
responsibility to protect the social good. This phenomenon is called the "privatiza-
tion" of public enforcement. The analysis demonstrates a fundamental divergence
between private and public incentives in False Claims Act prosecutions. The avail-
ability of private enforcers creates significant opportunities for public prosecutors to
overenforce. Moreover, the reduction in short-term risk causes Government prosecutors
to reduce the care that typically controls their exercise of prosecutorial discretion. The
explanatory power of the moral hazard analysis is borne out by a review of case law
that demonstrates private enforcement patterns that significantly depart from the
public goals of federal anti-fraud law. The Article concludes by proposing legislative
language that would reform the qui tam statute, and bring public and private en-
forcement goals into alignment.
INTRODUCTION
Private enforcement of public law is a central feature of the
modern regulatory state in areas as wide-ranging as civil rights,
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environmental protection, antitrust, securities law enforcement,
and civil prosecution to protect the United States against Medicare
and Medicaid fraud. Much has been written about whether and
when it is appropriate to authorize private actions to pursue public
objectives in these various contexts. Scholarly attention in this area
has focused primarily on the misalignment between incentives that
drive so-called "private attorneys general" and the public good.
Some have highlighted the risks of overenforcement by private at-
torneys in civil rights cases.' Others have raised concerns of
prosecutorial error in environmental protection suits.2 Still others
have warned of misdirected resources in antitrust3 and securities
litigation.4 At the same time, some scholars have argued for judicial
control to limit the perverse incentives that drive private enforc-
ers.5 Others advocate executive branch control to prevent private
enforcers from overreaching. Yet, despite the well-deserved, schol-
arly attention on both sides of this debate, the literature has missed
a different and vitally important set of incentive effects: the effects
that the availability of private enforcement have on the Govern-
ment's incentives.
This Article fills that gap. Here I demonstrate that the concept
of moral hazard-the well-recognized theory that a person takes
more risks and exercises less care when insured than she would if
uninsured-provides substantial explanatory power to re-
conceptualize the costs and benefits of private enforcement. The
availability of private enforcers creates significant opportunities for
public prosecutors to overenforce. Moreover, the reduction in
short term risk causes public prosecutors to reduce the care that
typically controls their exercise of prosecutorial discretion. Focus-
1. Myriam E. Gilles, Reinventing Structural Reform Litigation: Deputizing Private Citizens in
the Enforcement of Civil Rights, 100 COLUM. L. REv. 1384, 1452 (2000).
2. See id. at 1452; see also Barton H. Thompson,Jr., The Continuing Innovation of Citizen
Enforcement, 2000 U. ILL. L. REv. 185, 204-06 (2000) (claiming evidence of underenforce-
ment by private agencies, where the private enforcers fail to bring suits that would benefit
the common good).
3. Joseph E Brodley, Antitrust Standing in Private Merger Cases: Reconciling Private Incen-
tives and Public Enforcement Goals, 94 MICH. L. REv. 1, 2 (1995).
4. Joseph A. Grundfest, Disimplying Private Rights of Action Under the Federal Securities
Laws: The Commission's Authority, 107 HARV. L. REv. 961, 970 (1994). Grundfest also observed
that the converse is tne; private plaintiffs may fail to bring cases under the federal securities
law that the government would pursue if it had the resources. Id. at 970.
5. Richard B. Stewart & Cass R. Sunstein, Public Programs and Private Rights, 95 HARV.
L. REV. 1193, 1205 (1982).
6. Matthew C. Stephenson, Public Regulation of Private Enforcement: The Case for Expand-
ing the Role of Administrative Agencies, 91 VA. L. REv. 93, 106 (2005); see also Robert F.
Blomquist, Rethinking the Citizen as Prosecutor Model of Environmental Enforcement Under the
Clean Water Act: Some Overlooked Problems of Outcome-Independent Values, 22 GA. L. REv. 337, 338
(1988).
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ing on the moral hazard analogy offers a new set of tools with
which to approach the current debates about private enforcement
of public laws. Furthermore, focusing on the application of these
tools to the Civil False Claims Act provides fertile ground to exam-
ine the "real life" consequences of moral hazard in private-public
prosecution. The Civil False Claims Act (FCA) 7 is the Government's
"weapon of choice" for combating fraud." The qui tamr5 provision of
that statute allows the Government to enlist the assistance of private
parties in the Government's prosecution of fraud.'l The statute, for
7. 31 U.S.C. § 3729 (2000). The FCA provides in pertinent part, as follows:
(a) LIABILITY FOR CERTAIN ACTs.-Any person who-
(1) knowingly presents, or causes to be presented, to an officer or em-
ployee of the United States Government or a member of the Armed
Forces of the United States a false or fraudulent claim for payment or
approval;
(2) knowingly makes, uses, or causes to be made or used, a false record
or statement to get a false or fraudulent claim paid or approved by the
Government;
(3) conspires to defraud the Government by getting a false or fraudu-
lent claim allowed or paid;...
(7) knowingly makes, uses, or causes to be made or used, a false record
or statement to conceal, avoid, or decrease an obligation to pay or
transmit money or property to the Government,
is liable to the United States Government for a civil penalty of not less than $5,000
and not more than $10,000, plus 3 times the amount of damages which the Govern-
ment sustains because of the act of that person...
Id. at § 3729(a)(1)-(3), (7); see also Omnibus Consolidated Rescissions and Appropriations
Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321 (1996); Civil Monetary Penalties Inflation
Adjustment, 64 Fed. Reg. 47099, 47104 (Aug. 30, 1999) (to be codified at 28 C.ER. pt. 71).
8. Jo-Ellyn Sakowitz Klein, The Stark Laws: Conquering Physician Conflicts of Inteest?, 87
GEO. L.J. 499, 502 (1998). See generally Dan L. Hargrove, Soldiers of Qui Tam Fortune: Do Mili-
tary Soldiers Have Standing to File Qui Tam Actions Under the False Claims Act, 34 PUB. CONT.
L.J. 45, 47 (2004) (explaining the FCA is the U.S. Government's most potent weapon against
contractor fraud).
9. Qui tam plaintiffs are called "relators" and may bring a civil action for violation of the
FCA and, according to 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b), may recover up to twenty-five percent of the gov-
ernment's total judgment or settlement proceeds awarded in an FCA action pursuant to 31
U.S.C. § 3730. The phrase "qui tam" is a truncation for the Latin phrase given to the private
causes of action a plaintiff may bring on behalf of the government. The entire Latin phrase is
.qui tam pro domino rege quam se ipso in hac parte sequitur," which means "who as well for
the king as for himself sues in this matter." BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 1282 (8th ed. 2004).
10. 31 U.S.C. § 3730 defines the qui tam action as follows:
A person may bring a civil action for a violation of section 3729 for the person and
for the United States Government. The action shall be brought in the name of the
Government. The action may be dismissed only if the court and the Attorney General
give written consent to the dismissal and their reasons for consenting.
31 U.S.C. § 3730 (b)(1).
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sound legal and policy reasons, was drafted to place the Govern-
ment squarely in control of all FCA prosecutions, including those
involving qui tam relators. However, the data presented here shows
that the Government is losing control of these actions at an alarm-
ing rate.
Since 1986, over 4,700 qui tam cases have been filed and a total
of $15 billion has been collected in settlements and judgments
against defendants under the FCA." Total qui tam recoveries have
soared from a mere $390,000 in the year 1988, to $1.1 billion in
2005.12 Most notably, the percentage of privately initiated FCA ac-
tions reflects that an overwhelming majority of the cases brought
under the statute in pursuit of public anti-fraud goals are now be-
ing brought by private, not public enforcers. In 1987, over ninety
percent of FCA actions were filed by the Government alone, but by
2005, nearly eighty percent of all new FCA actions were filed by
private qui tam litigants. This dramatic privatization of FCA claims
has hindered the orderly development of well-reasoned substantive
law and has clearly distorted the market incentives and relation-
ships between industry actors.
Nowhere is this trend more pervasive than in the FCA cases
against the pharmaceutical industry. Nearly all of the largest set-
tlements and judgments announced against pharmaceutical
defendants during the last three years have involved a qui tam rela-
tor. In fact, the impact of private litigants' leadership in these cases
has been significant, and contrary to the original intent of the Act.
Therefore, FCA prosecution of pharmaceutical fraud provides an
ideal case to study what occurs when the Government overwhelm-
ingly cedes its responsibility to protect the social good to private
enforcers.
In light of the increase in privatization of prosecutions of claims
against the Government, this Article examines the fundamental
divergence between private and public incentives in FCA prosecu-
tions. Understanding the effects that private enforcement has on
Government incentives in the FCA context suggests a new ap-
proach to aligning public and private incentives elsewhere. I
propose a solution focused on reinvigorating the traditional role
that public agencies play in overseeing private attorneys general.
Reforming the FCA to solve the moral hazard problem is impera-
tive, and can shed important light on how to conceptualize private
enforcement across the entire spectrum of public regulation.
11 JOHN T. BOESE, CIVIL FALSE CLAIMS AND Qui TAM ACTIONS H-I (3d ed. 2006).
12. See id.
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Part I of the Article compares the statutory role of the qui tam re-
lator to empirical evidence of the actual function of private
plaintiffs in fraud prosecution. It then presents data describing the
enormity of the current trend-away from the oversight and con-
trol the statute originally intended the Government to exercise,
towards independence on the part of private enforcers-that I call
"privatization." In Part II, I use the concept of moral hazard to ex-
plain the results of this trend. The Government's abdication of
authority under the FCA results in over-prosecution and a harmful
reduction in the Government's exercise of caution in the selection
and pursuit of these cases. Part III tests the moral hazard explana-
tion by offering several examples of recent, enormously lucrative
and highly publicized FCA prosecutions against pharmaceutical
defendants. It confirms that the moral hazard explanation is in-
formative in this context. These cases show that privatization is
costly. Due to the moral hazard problem that arises from privatiza-
tion, FCA claims increasingly attract plaintiffs with questionable
motives who advance and inadvertently make bad law, which sup-
plants the reasoned regulatory regime that should govern
Government contractors' conduct.
1 3
The explanatory power of the moral hazard concept is demon-
strated by several examples of FCA actions against pharmaceutical
companies that have resulted in billions of dollars in settlements
and judgments without any clear finding of fault or liability. In Part
IV, I propose a revision for the qui tam statute, and provide sug-
gested legislative language to accomplish this much needed
reform.
I. DISTORTING THE RELATIONSHIP
BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT AND THE QuI TAM RELATOR
The plain language of the FCA reveals the originally-intended
balance between the Government and private relators' roles in
prosecuting fraud under the FCA. Congress intended the
13. For example, in 2004, the largest and most lucrative of all FCA health fraud cases
was a qui tam filing in which the Government learned the proof was insufficient to criminally
convict the defendants only after spending hundreds of millions of public dollars to pay qui
tam relators and litigation costs, only after the pharmaceutical firms paid hundreds of mil-
lions of dollars in civil and criminal fines, and only after individual physician defendants
capitulated and pled guilty to criminal charges, leaving the private qui tam relator to repeat
the same charges anew, against another defendant. See Neil Weinberg, The Dark Side of Whis-
teblowing, FORBES, Mar. 2005, at 90.
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Government to control FCA litigation by qui tam relators.14 Con-
gress crafted the FCA statute to grant permission to private parties
to litigate on behalf of the Government, but the statute requires
such parties to be meticulously accountable and subordinate to the
Government in such cases. This section reviews the statutory lan-
guage of the FCA that preserves the Government's authority over
FCA prosecutions, and then reviews data that reveals that the Gov-
ernment's statutory authority has been usurped.
Although the FCA was originally enacted in 1863 to encourage
private individuals to join in the fight against fraud on the Gov-
ernment during the Civil War, the statute laid virtually dormant
until 1986."5 In that year, Congress amended the FCA's whistle-
blower or qui tam provision to substantially increase the rewards
available to private persons who bring actions on behalf of the
Government.16 This amendment brought the partnership between
public and private enforcement of the FCA to life.
The originally contemplated structure of the law placed the U.S.
Government squarely in control of all anti-fraud litigation. Recent
experience, however, indicates that Congress' intent has not been
borne out in practice, to the detriment of both the Government
and the qui tam relator. According to the plain language of the
statute, the qui tam relator is intended to assist in the prosecution
of the action subject to the Government's leadership. The qui tam
provision creates a private cause of action that allows the relator to
engage in litigation both for himself and on behalf of the U.S.
Government.17 The statute requires that actions filed by a qui tam
relator remain under seal while the Government is allowed a pe-
riod of time to investigate the claim and decide whether or not to
intervene and prosecute the claim directly.'s After sixty days, the
14. See, e.g., Myriam E. Gilles, Representational Standing: U.S. ex rel. Stevens and the Fu-
ture of Public Law Litigation, 89 CAL. L. REv. 315 (2001); see alsoJohn H. Beisner, Matthew
Shors &Jessica Davidson Miller, Class Action "Cops": Public Servants or Private Entrepreneurs ?, 57
STAN. L. REv. 1441 (2005).
15. See False Claims Amendment Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-562, §§ 3-4, 100 Stat.
3153, 3154-58 (1986) (codified as amended at 31 U.S.C. § 3730); James B. Helmer, Jr. &
Robert Clark Neff, Jr., War Stories: A History of the Qui Tam Provisions of the False Claims Act, the
1986 Amendments to the False Claims Act, and Their Application in the United States ex rel.
Gravitt v. General Electric Co. Litigation, 18 Oro N.U. L. REv. 35, 46 (1991); James Roy
Moncus III, The Marriage of the False Claims Act and the Freedom of Information Act: Parasitic
Potential or Positive Synergy?, 55 VAND. L. REv. 1549, 1553-55 (2002).
16. See 31 U.S.C. § 3730(d) (1)-(2) (2000) (a qui tam plaintiff may receive between 15
and 30 percent of trebled damages proved and of fines between $5,500 and $11,000 per
fraudulent claim, plus expenses including attorneys fees); Pamela H. Bucy, Private Justice and
the Constitution, 69 TENN. L. REv. 939, 943 n.21 (2002).
17. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(a) provides in salient part that any person may bring an action
under the False Claims Act on behalf of himself, as well as on behalf of the Government.
18. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(2).
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Complaint may be unsealed, and the qui tam relator may proceed
with prosecuting the claim.' 9 If the Government chooses to inter-
vene, the Government takes over the prosecution of the case. If,
however, the Government declines to intervene, the Government
may actively monitor the case, which includes the right to review all
pleadings ° and to later join the case for "good cause shown."2' In
fact, the statute gives the Government a number of additional op-
tions so that it can control a case, even if it decides neither to
intervene nor declines to intervene until the case is about to con-
clude." The Government may request an indefinite number of
23continuances while it considers and reviews the case at issue.
When the Government does intervene, its primacy is unquestion-
able.24 The qui tam relator must give its full cooperation, or the
19. Id.
20. Id. § 3730(b) (3).
If the Government elects not to proceed with the action, the person who initiated the
action shall have the right to conduct the action. If the Government so requests, it
shall be served with copies of all pleadings filed in the action and shall be supplied
with copies of all deposition transcripts (at the Government's expense). When a per-
son proceeds with the action, the court, without limiting the status and rights of the
person initiating the action, may nevertheless permit the Government to intervene at
a later date upon a showing of good cause.
31 U.S.C. § 3730(c) (3).
21. Id.
22.
Before the expiration of the 60-day period or any extensions obtained under para-
graph (3), the Government shall-
(A) proceed with the action, in which case the action shall be conducted by
the Government; or
(B) notify the court that it declines to take over the action, in which case
the person bringing the action shall have the right to conduct the ac-
tion.
Id. § 3730(b) (4) (A)-(B).
23. Id. § 3730(b)(3) ("The Government may, for good cause shown, move the court
for extensions of the time during which the complaint remains under seal under paragraph
(2).").
24. "When a person brings an action under this subsection, no person other than the
Government may intervene or bring a related action based on the facts underlying the
pending action." Id. § 3730(b) (5).
If the Government proceeds with the action, it shall have the primary responsibility
for prosecuting the action, and shall not be bound by an act of the person bringing
the action. Such person shall have the right to continue as a party to the action, sub-
ject to the limitations set forth in paragraph (2).
WINTER 2007]
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Government may choose to limit the private party's role in litiga-
25tion.
Additionally, the Government has several other entitlements
throughout the course of litigation. The Government must receive
a full disclosure of "substantially all" the qui tam relator's material
evidence.26 During the virtually unlimited period of time when it
may review the contents of the relator's claims, the private plaintiff
must give the Government its full cooperation in the investigation.
The Government may cause the qui tam relator's claim to be
stayed.27 The Government may preempt the relator's claim by pur-
Id. § 3730(c) (1).
25.
Upon a showing by the Government that unrestricted participation during the course
of the litigation by the person initiating the action would interfere with or unduly de-
lay the Government's prosecution of the case, or would be repetitious, irrelevant, or
for purposes of harassment, the court may, in its discretion, impose limitations on the
person's participation, such as-
(i) limiting the number of witnesses the person may call;
(ii) limiting the length of the testimony of such witnesses;
(iii) limiting the person's cross-examination of witnesses; or
(iv) otherwise limiting the participation by the person in the litigation.
Id. § 3730(c) (2) (C).
Upon a showing by the defendant that unrestricted participation during the course
of the litigation by the person initiating the action would be for purposes of harass-
ment or would cause the defendant undue burden or unnecessary expense, the court
may limit the participation by the person in the litigation.
Id. § 3730(c) (2) (D).
26.
A copy of the complaint and written disclosure of substantially all material evidence
and information the person possesses shall be served on the Government pursuant to
Rule 4(d) (4) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The complaint shall be filed in
camera, shall remain under seal for at least 60 days, and shall not be served on the
defendant until the court so orders. The Government may elect to intervene and
proceed with the action within 60 days after it receives both the complaint and the
material evidence and information.
Id. § 3730(b) (2).
27.
Whether or not the Government proceeds with the action, upon a showing by the
Government that certain actions of discovery by the person initiating the action
would interfere with the Government's investigation or prosecution of a criminal or
civil matter arising out of the same facts, the court may stay such discovery for a pe-
riod of not more than 60 days. Such a showing shall be conducted in camera. The
court may extend the 60-day period upon a further showing in camera that the Gov-
ernment has pursued the criminal or civil investigation or proceedings with
[VOL. 40:2
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suing the matter through alternative means.28 The Government
may settle the matter over the qui tam relator's objection.2 9 The
Government may also simply dismiss the claim.30 Ultimately, the
Government may even move to reduce the relator's statutory share,
or completely cut the relator out of his share of proceeds at the
end of a case that the Government and relator have litigated to-
gether for years.3
reasonable diligence and any proposed discovery in the civil action will interfere with
the ongoing criminal or civil investigation or proceedings.
Id. § 3730(c) (4).
28.
Notwithstanding subsection (b), the Government may elect to pursue its claim
through any alternate remedy available to the Government, including any adminis-
trative proceeding to determine a civil money penalty. If any such alternate remedy is
pursued in another proceeding, the person initiating the action shall have the same
rights in such proceeding as such person would have had if the action had continued
under this section. Any finding of fact or conclusion of law made in such other pro-
ceeding that has become final shall be conclusive on all parties to an action under
this section. For purposes of the preceding sentence, a finding or conclusion is final
if it has been finally determined on appeal to the appropriate court of the United
States, if all time for filing such an appeal with respect to the finding or conclusion
has expired, or if the finding or conclusion is not subject to judicial review.
Id. § 3730(c) (5).
29.
The Government may settle the action with the defendant notwithstanding the objec-
tions of the person initiating the action if the court determines, after a hearing, that
the proposed settlement is fair, adequate, and reasonable under all the circum-
stances. Upon a showing of good cause, such hearing may be held in camera.
Id. § 3730(c) (2) (B).
30.
The Government may dismiss the action notwithstanding the objections of the per-
son initiating the action if the person has been notified by the Government of the
filing of the motion and the court has provided the person with an opportunity for a
hearing on the motion.
Id. § 3730(c) (2) (A).
31. See, e.g., United States ex reL Merena v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 114 F Supp. 2d
352, 371 (E.D. Pa. 2000), remanded from 205 F.3d 97 (3d Cir. 2000), revg 52 . Supp. 2d 420
(E.D. Pa. 1988) (After working extensively with plaintiff, the Department of Justice tried
unsuccessfully, through protracted litigation under the FCA, to limit the relator's share of
settlement proceeds negotiated with SmithKline). The fact that the Government can and
sometimes does seek to prevent any recovery by the relator raises the possibility of the Gov-
ernment simply riding the coattails of litigation largely prosecuted by the relator, winning in
court, and then attempting to bar the relator from enjoying any of the fruits of the litiga-
tion. Such a situation would produce a serious disincentive for the Government to
participate in, much less lead, a qui tam case.
WIN TER 2007]
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In exchange for the information and assistance the qui tam rela-
tor provides, the statute gives the plaintiff a right to share in the
proceeds from any settlements or judgments paid by the defen-
dant, whether or not the Government intervenes.32 However, the
Government's decision to intervene is a vitally important one to
the relator, not only because it determines the percentage share of
recovery that a qui tam relator may be awarded, but also because
the evidence shows that when the Government intervenes and
takes over the lead role of prosecuting FCA cases, the chances of
success and monetary value of that claim increase substantially.
3
The relators' share of rewards in FCA cases is greatly enhanced
by the Government's presence.34 Not only are the amounts of rela-
tors' recoveries and rewards greater when the Government
intervenes, but the chances of winning those rewards are improved
greatly by the Government's participation.3 5 As of September 30,
2005, the Government had intervened in 940 FCA cases." The
Government had declined to intervene in 3,288 cases, and 901
FCA matters were open and under investigation at that time.
When the Government intervenes, the disposition of the case is far
more likely to end in judgment or settlement, resulting in financial
recovery for both the Government and the qui tam relator.
Eighty-three percent of the cases in which the Government has
intervened have resulted in settlement or judgment, while only six
percent of the cases in which the Government has declined to in-
tervene have had the same result. Conversely, the percentage of
cases dismissed where the qui tam relator proceeds alone-eighty
percent-is huge when compared to the mere four percent of
cases dismissed when the Government is present.3 8 Certainly, the
32. In a successful false claims action, the qui tam relator is statutorily entitled to re-
ceive between twenty-five and thirty-five percent of the proceeds of any recovery or
settlement paid in a case in which the Government does not intervene. See 31 U.S.C.
§ 3730(d) (2). In a case in which the Government does intervene, the relator is entitled to
receive between fifteen and twenty-five percent of the recovery of settlement or judgment
paid based upon "the extent to which the person substantially contributed to the prosecu-
tion of the action." Id. § 3730(d) (1).
33. Since 1986, a total of $9.239 billion has been recovered in cases where the Gov-
ernment has intervened, while during the same period, $400 million has been recovered in
cases pursued by relators alone. See BOESE, supra note 11, at H-2.
34. Since 1986, relators' rewards in cases where the Government has intervened have
totaled $1.5 billion, while relators have recovered only $99.3 million in cases where the Gov-
ernment did not participate. Id.
35. Since 1986, a total of 5,129 FCA cases have been filed. Id.
36. See id. at H-6.
37. Id.
38. See ROBERT FABRIKANT ET AL., HEALTH CARE FRAUD: ENFORCEMENT AND COMPLI-
ANCE § 4.01 [3], at 4-53 (Release 19, LawJournal Press 2006).
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benefits the relator receives from the Government's intervention
are clear.'
On the other hand, the Government receives benefits from qui
tam relators' participation in FCA cases as well. The Government's
investigation and prosecution is made more effective by the inside
information the qui tam relator provides. This information en-
hances the Government's chances of success and the size of
recoveries from defendants. 40 Certainly, the Government is able to
pursue a larger number of cases in the presence of qui tam relators
than it would without such private enforcement assistance.
Although the Government has committed significant resources
to FCA enforcement, these resources are stretched. There are a
number of state and federal enforcement agencies simultaneously
investigating and prosecuting pharmaceutical fraud. In some in-
stances, these agencies are engaged in a coordinated effort,
sharing investigatory information, and centrally managing a prose-
cutorial effort. However, in many instances there is no
coordination, and investigations as well as prosecutorial efforts
overlap.4' Despite the number of agencies, and professionals within
39. Alternatively, one might surmise that the qui tam relators perform a sorting func-
tion for the government, reducing the total universe of potential FCA cases, to the most
colorable or valuable claims. That private attorney generals might filter the meritless cases is
not supported by the examples of cases dismissed and criminal claims tried after civil settle-
ments have been reached. See infra Part III. While the higher quality claims may be the ones
that are settling, the cases going to trial are examples of claims that could and perhaps
should have been foreclosed even before they were disposed of by expensive litigation. Id.
40. See Pamela H. Bucy, Games and Stories: Game Theory and the Civil False Claims Act, 31
FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 603, 616 (2004).
41. Annually, the Office of Inspector General of the Department of Health and Hu-
man Services (OIG) issues a "Work Plan" to announce the areas of its investigative focus. For
example, the Work plan for the fiscal year 2003 indicated that the OIG would be focusing on
illegal marketing and distribution of prescription drugs and other fraudulent schemes as an
area of its investigative focus. Office of Inspector Gen., U.S. Dep't of Health & Human
SERVS., WORKPLAN FISCAL YEAR 2003 (2003), available at http://oig.hhs.gov/reading/w
orkplan/2003/Work%20Plan%202003.pdf. Both the Civil and Criminal Divisions of the
Department of Justice participate in the evaluation and investigation of qui tam actions filed
under the False Claims Act. Each United States Attorney's Office also has a health care fraud
coordinator and prosecutes local cases. Several programs to coordinate these efforts operate
under the auspices of the DOJ. For example, under the Health Insurance Portability and
Accountability Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-191 § 201, 110 Stat. 1936, 1992-96 (codified at
42 U.S.C. §§ 1320a-7c) (HIPAA), the National Health Care Fraud and Abuse Control Pro-
gram is run by the Attorney General, and the Secretary of the Department of Health and
Human Services (DHHS). Similarly, the National Health Care Fraud Task Force, chaired by
the Deputy Attorney General, coordinates prosecutions run by the DOJ, DHHS/OIG, The
Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS), and state and local prosecutors. The
Department of Health and Human Services Office of Inspector General conducts fraud
audits and investigations and then refers cases to the Department of Justice for administra-
tive, civil, and criminal prosecution. In addition to the Department of Justice, several other
investigatory and prosecutorial federal departments, including the Defense Criminal
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those agencies addressing the health care fraud problem, the Gov-
ernment continues to be shorthanded in its effort to find and
prosecute pharmaceutical and other health care fraud. When large
corporations engage in fraud, it is often only revealed in ways that
are difficult to uncover and complex to unravel.42 For these rea-
sons, the qui tam relator is often essential to uncovering and
understanding the fraudulent schemes, and is essential to the
prosecutorial effort.
When the Government and qui tam relators work together, both
benefit. However, Congress sought to balance the Government's
primacy under the statute by including protections for relators
within the terms of the FCA. The statute creates a cause of action
for a plaintiff who suffers retaliation from his or her employer, and
provides for the recovery of damages plus twice the amount of
back pay, compensatory and special damages, and attorneys' fees.43
The 1986 Amendments to the FCA provided powerful protection
for the qui tam relator, whenever she has a good-faith reasonable
belief when reporting that his employer has defrauded the Gov-
ernment. 44 The statute also contains protections against abuses by
relators such as the original source jurisdictional bar.45
Reviewing the FCA's procedural and substantive terms, it is clear
that Congress lodged leadership on anti-fraud claims with the Gov-
ernment, notwithstanding the symbiotic relationship between the
Government and the qui tam relator.
Recent cases indicate a departure from the balanced system the
FCA was intended to implement. Prior to 1986, an average of six
claims per year46 were filed under the old statute.4 7 There have
481been 4,704 qui tam cases filed since that year. Qui tam recoveries
Investigative Service, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Postal Inspection Service, and
the Drug Enforcement Agency, are involved in prosecutorial activities ranging from record
reviews to criminal indictments involving pharmaceutical fraud. SeeJoan H. Krause, A Con-
ceptual Model of Health Care Fraud Enforcement, 12J.L. & POL'Y 55, 59-60 (2004).
42. See Pamela H. Bucy, PrivateJustice, 76 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 3-5 (2002).
43. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(h).
44. Id.
45. Id. § 3730(d) (1) (providing that if the false claims suit brought by the qui tam rela-
tor is based on allegations that have already been publicly disclosed, however, the qui tam
relator is the "original source" of that publicly disclosed information, and the relator is
barred from recovery). See also United States ex rel Merena v. SmithKline Beecham Corp.,
205 F.3d 97, 106 (3d Cir. 2000) (finding a qui tam relator may not receive proceeds from a
settlement claim publicly disclosed, for which the relator was not the original source).
46. See Bucy supra note 42, at 156.
47. During the 1986 revision of the False Claims Act, the statute was regarded as un-
derutilized, and therefore, the Legislature's objective was to increase the number of cases
being filed. See S. REP. No. 99-345, at 1-2 (1986), as re printed in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5266,
5266-67.
48. See BoEsE, supra note 11, at H-1.
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have increased by over one hundred thirty percent during the past
ten year period, providing a significant incentive to motivate pri-
vate parties to prosecute fraud against the Government.49 The data
also make it easy to see why relators are eager for Government in-
tervention. The Government's participation markedly increases the
absolute dollar amount of recoveries available to qui tam plaintiffs.0
Recent reports of several high profile FCA cases, each of which cost
taxpayers hundreds of millions of dollars to prosecute but which
ultimately had questionable basis in fact,51 belie the seductive influ-
ence of the large financial incentives imbedded in the FCA
statutory structure. Often, the DOJ announces settlements from
health care providers that pay qui tam awards to individual plaintiffs
in excess of $15 million. 2 Awards to plaintiffs of between $1 mil-
lion and $10 million are announced regularly.53 Over the eighteen
years since Congress amended the FCA statute, relators have col-
lected the majority of their earnings under the statute within the
last five years. Since 1986, private False Claims Act plaintiffs have
been awarded $1.42 billion in total judgments and seventy percent
of that total-$995.0 million-has been paid out to relators since
the year 2000.5' The data below in Table 1 illustrates significant
49. See infra Table 1.
50. See MICHAEL G. SCHEININGER & GREGORY T. JAEGER, ABA CTR. FOR CONTINUING
LEGAL EDUC. NAT'L INST. Nov. 19-20, 1998, THE PRE-INTERVENTION PRESENTATION TO THE
GOVERNMENT: AN IMPORTANT STEP IN SUCCESSFUL QUI TAM DEFENSE M-2 (1998).
51. SeeWeinberg, supra note 13, at 90.
52. See FABRIKANT ET AL., supra note 38, § 4.01[3][f]; see also John F. Murphy,
What Are the Rewards, Examples of Recoveries by Whistleblowers, http://
www.whistleblowerlawyer.com/reward.htm (last visited Nov. 30, 2006) (on file with the Uni-
versity of Michigan Journal of Law Reform) (indicating a recovery for $22.5 million to the
relator in a case against United Technologies, Inc. which involved a helicopter contract and
$18.45 million paid to the relator who filed against Lucas Industries, Inc. to allege falsifica-
tion of gear box records on Navy fighterjets and Army rocket launchers).
53. FABRIKANT ET AL., supra note 38, § 4.01 [3] [f]. When Congress amended the False
Claims Act in 1986 to treble the damages available to qui tam relators, Congress clearly in-
tended to provide a strong financial incentive for private parties to report and prosecute
fraud. S. REP. No. 99-345, at 10-12 (1986), as reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5266, 5275-77.
In fact, the size of qui tam relator recoveries in health care fraud cases alone has been in-
creasing substantially since 1986. These rewards, paid to individuals as well as to corporate
qui tam relators, in recent years, have often exceeded $20 million. LAURIE E. EKSTRAND, U.S.
GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, INFORMATION ON FALSE CLAIMS ACT LITIGATION: BRIEFING
FOR CONGRESSIONAL REQUESTORS DEC. 15, 2005 1-2 (Jan. 31, 2006), available at http://
www.gao.gov/new.items/d06320r.pdf. In 1998, two qui tam relators earned $52 million for
their role in prosecuting SmithKline Beecham Corporation in an FCA action alleging fraud
and improper billing practices by SmithKline. United States ex rel Merena v. SmithKline
Beecham Corp., 52 F. Supp. 2d 420 (E.D. Pa. 1998). But see United States ex reL Merena v.
SmithKline Beecham Corp., 114 F. Supp. 2d 352 (E.D. Pa. 2000) (revising relators' awards
based on original source and "first to file"jurisdictional bars).
54. Id.
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trends in qui tam litigation over the past seven years. Table 1 below
shows that the Government has proportionately increased its re-
turns on funds expended for enforcement. This suggests the
Government is getting more than it is spending on anti-fraud
prosecution under the FCA. This is an advantageous outcome for
the Government.
TABLE 155
QUANTIFYING THE RECENT ROLE OF THE Qui Tam RELATOR
(1998-PRESENT)
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 20030 2004 2005 Increase"
Total Recovered 613.6 713.4 1,572.37 1,795.3 1,210.2 2,219.2 681.2 1,418.5 131%
Amount




Number of New FCA 589 623 463 398 383 427 528 494 (16.1%)
Matters
Number of New Oui 470 482 367 310 320 334 415 394 (16.2%)
TAM
Percent Qu TAM 79.8 77.4 79.3 77.9 83.6 78.2 78.6 79.8 -
Number of New 323 340 260 215 212 243 304 306 (17.0)%
Health Cases II
Percent Oui TAM 88.9 91.4 85.8 83.7 92.9 89.3 90.8 88.2 -
Number of New 107 143 87 85 88 89 115 110 2.8%
Defense Case
Percent Oui TAM 72.9 76.9 88.5 87.1 81.8 87.6 86.1% 88.2% -
The data in Table 1 tells at least two important stories. First, it il-
lustrates the profitable enterprise that FCA litigation is for both
private qui tam relators and for the Government. Second, these sta-
tistics illustrate the sizeable share of FCA prosecutions led by
55. See Fried, Frank, Harris, Shriver & Jacobson LLP, Qui Tam FCA Statistics, Sept. 30,
2003, http://www.flhsj.com/quitam/fcastats.htm (last visited Nov. 30, 2006) (on file with
the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform).
56. Data from 2004 and 2005 present some notable aberrations. In 2004, although a
total of 528 new matters were filed, and nearly eighty percent of those were qui tam actions,
total fraud recoveries declined to $681.2 million. This represents a 69.3% drop in recoveries,
despite a twenty-one percent increase in the number of qui tam actions filed over the previ-
ous year. In 2005, however, overall recoveries rose again to $1.4 billion. There was a 16.1%
increase in the number of new matters filed overall. While we cannot tell from this data what
might account for the decline in 2004 recoveries, two observations are relevant. First, the
2005 data suggests the upward trend in privatization has resumed. Second, the privatization
trend is most pronounced in health care cases where nearly ninety percent of FCA litigation
is initiated by a qui tam plaintiff. See BOESE, supra note 11, at H-2.
57. Aside from the aberration in 2004, on average, FCA recoveries have increased
119.24% each year during the period from 1998 to 2005. See id.
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private plaintiffs in every major category of fraud cases prosecuted
under the statute.
Table 1 also shows that in FCA prosecutions generally, the an-
nual share of FCA matters filed by qui tam plaintiffs has remained
relatively constant over the period from 1998 to 2005. The data
further confirm that the Government is not merely recovering
misspent funds lost to fraud, but actually making a profit on its
anti-fraud enforcement activities. During this time, the Govern-
ment certified an increasing amount of recovered settlements,
judgments, and fines to return to its coffers for future
enforcement. However, the increase in the amounts recovered
during this time grew faster than enforcement expenditures.5
The most striking information conveyed by this data, however, is
the extent to which private qui tam enforcement has become the
leading method of prosecuting fraud under the FCA.59 However,
even Table 1 does not tell the whole story. Looking only at recent
history, it appears from Table 1 that the level of qui tam activity un-
der the statute has remained relatively stable.
Table 2 summarizes the substantial growth in private prosecu-
tions under the FCA since the statute's last amendment in 1986
and demonstrates the tremendous impact private parties have had
on FCA enforcement.
58. See JACK A. MEYER, FIGHTING MEDICARE FRAUD: MORE BANG FOR THE FEDERAL
BUCK: PREPARED FOR TAXPAYERS AGAINST FRAUD EDUCATION FUND (May 21, 2004) (on file
with the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform) [hereinafter MEYER REPORT], avail-
able at http://www.taf.org/meyerreport.htm; see also Dayna Bowen Matthew, Tainted
Prosecution of Tainted Claims, 76 IND. L.J. 525, 582-83 (2001) (discussing the impact of the
Government's share of enforcement proceeds exercised by independent prosecutorial dis-
cretion).
59. In 1999, 481 new FCA claims were filed. The next year that number dropped pre-
cipitously to only 366 cases. In 2001, 300 cases were filed under the FCA; 320 were filed in
2002; and 326 were filed in 2003. This means there has been an 8.6% increase in the num-
ber of cases filed over the past three years. This is despite a 42.6% increase in the total
spending outlays for Federal Civil False Claims Act enforcement in the health care fraud
area alone. See CIVIL Div., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, FRAUD STATISTICS--OVERVIEW (Oct. 1,
1986-Sept. 30, 2005) (on file with the University of MichiganJournal of Law Reform), avail-
able at http://www.ffhsj.com/quitam/pdf/stats-overview.pdf (noting the total federal costs
of health care fraud enforcement); see also Whistleblowersonline.com, Qui Tam False Claims
Act-Statistics, http://wwwwhistleblowersonline.com/demographics.htm (last visited Nov. 30,
2006) (on file with the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform) (noting the total
number of qui tam cases filed).
WINTER 2007]
University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform
TABLE 2
QUANTIFYING THE HISTORICAL ROLE OF THE
Qui TAM RELATOR (1987-PRESENT)
1987 2005 Increase
Number of New FCA Matters 393 494 25.7%
Percent Oui Tam 8.1% 79.7% -
Number of New Health Care 18 306 1600%
Percent Oui Tam 22.2% 88.2% -
Number of New Defense 263 110 (58.2%)
Percent Oui Tam 6.8% 88.1% -
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Table 2 provides concrete evidence of the privatization of False
Claims Act prosecution. Taken together, the data in Tables 1 and 2
show: an increase in the absolute number of new FCA claims filed
over the past ten years; a dramatic increase in the percentage share
of those claims being brought by private plaintiffs; and an astound-
ing increase in the number of those FCA cases that are brought
against defendants in the health care sector. From 1987 to 2005,
the percentage of new FCA claims filed by private qui tam parties
increased nearly ten-fold from 8% in 1987 to 79.7% in 2005. The
upsurge in the number of health care fraud cases is overwhelm-
ingly driven by private enforcement. In 1987, eighteen new cases
were filed by the Department of Health and Human Services and
four of those, or 22%, were filed by qui tam parties. By contrast, in
2005, 306 new health care fraud matters were filed and 270 of
those, or 88%, were filed by private litigants.
The empirical fact is that the vast majority of anti-fraud en-
forcement is conducted by private, rather than Government,
enforcers. While the balance of power appears to have shifted away
from the Government and towards private enforcement, in order
to determine whether this data represents a true departure from
the original design of the statute the salient question is whether
these qui tam-directed cases are different in any meaningful way
from cases the Government controls. The trend is a significant one
only if the Government's declining role and the increased pres-
ence of private enforcement results in some substantive departure
from the statute's intent. The important question is whether priva-
tization changes either the Government's procedural decisions or
the substantive law decided in FCA cases. The next section intro-
duces the moral hazard theory to explain the ways in which
privatization has a profound impact on the Government's en-
forcement decisions.
Qui Tam Moral Hazard
II. THE MORAL HAZARD PROBLEM OF THE QuI TAM RELATOR
Without question, the qui tam statute provides a key dimension
to the anti-fraud effort. The law grants relators a lucrative share in
settlement and judgment proceeds as an incentive to encourage
private attorneys general to undertake the discovery of fraud. The
private enforcers can minimize the costs of proving fraud by pro-
viding valuable "inside information." 60 On the other hand, there
are also costs associated with the relator's participation. Privatization
means the qui tam relator is not being effectively subordinated to
the Government's direction or supervision. This has impact on the
quality of cases pursued, the number of cases pursued, and the
strength of legal theories advanced when cases are pursued. Due to
the sizable potential of financial gain, some qui tam relators will
pursue cases with poor factual support or pursue flimsy legal theo-
ries that establish bad precedent and waste public resources. In
contrast to the Government, the qui tam relator does not have the
ethical obligation to protect the interests of the public at large.
Moreover, the private relator has neither an ethical nor financial
interest compelling it to consider the impact of frivolously impos-
ing defense costs on target companies. The Government, on the
other hand, is expected to exercise prosecutorial discretion that
takes into account what social goods might be sacrificed by initiat-
ing a lawsuit. However, when relators initiate FCA claims, the
Government's initial prosecutorial choice-whether or not to
sue-has been usurped by a private party. Where a relator has ini-
tiated the FCA claim, the investment choices the Government now
faces are very different.
Compare the Government's investment choices with and with-
out relators when deciding whether to initiate an FCA suit: When
the Government initiates an FCA claim independently, it does not
know in advance what the outcome of that lawsuit will be. Because
its enforcement budget is limited, the Government chooses which
cases are meritorious and most likely to lead to a return on its in-
vestment of scarce public resources. A key part of the
Government's calculus includes its obligation to choose litigation
opportunities and strategies that will further legislatively-
established objectives for the public good. With these goals in
mind, the Government will effectively triage the cases it pursues
based on the size of the case, the seriousness of the fraud alleged,
60. Pamela Bucy, Information as a Commodity in the Regulatory World, 39 Hous. L. REV.
905,908 (2002).
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the potential proceeds that may come from the case, the time it
will take to litigate the case, the quality of information available
about the case, and several other considerations. 6 If the costs of
pursuing any particular case outweigh the potential benefits, the
Government will decline to pursue that case and Government re-
sources will be available for use in other cases.
The Government's calculus changes in the presence of a qui tam
relator. When the Government decides whether to intervene in a
case brought by a qui tam relator, the Government spends virtually
no public resources to initiate a relator-directed lawsuit. Moreover,
the Government incurs only minimal monitoring costs to sit back
and allow the private party to file an FCA case and to pay the up
front litigation costs for pursuing that claim. The potential return
on this small investment ranges from zero to seventy percent of
trebled damages. Therefore, the incentive for the Government to
allow these cases to go forward is very high. It is of no moment that
the relator-directed cases may be ones which the Government would
not bring directly given its limited resources. Moreover, whereas
the Government gets the benefit of employing its resources else-
where if it declines to pursue a case directly, the Government frees
negligible resources by opposing the progress of a qui tam initiated
case. In fact, at first blush, the most expensive alternative available
to the Government is to prematurely intervene in a case that will
then become the Government's responsibility to prosecute. The
structural incentives for the Government all point in one direction:
stand back and allow qui-tam suits to go forward. This problematic
incentive structure is explained by the concept of moral hazard.
A. Applying the Theory of Moral Hazard to
Private Qui Tam Enforcement
Moral hazard, simply defined, is opportunistic behavior on the
part of an insured party. The term moral hazard describes a
problem that increases the size of losses an insured suffers when
the insured party exchanges its cost-minimizing behavior, for
cost-generating conduct, based on the presence of an insurance
contract.62 Moral hazard results when an insured party is less averse
to risk due to the knowledge that any losses from risky behavior will
61. Ben Depoorter & Jef De Mot, 2006 Whistle Blowing: An Economic Analysis of the False
Claims Act, 14 Sup. CT. ECON. REv. 135, 148-51 (Francesco Parisi et al. eds., 2006).
62. See ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS UIEN, LAW AND ECONOMICS 50 (3d ed. 2000).
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be borne by the insurer.6 3 As a result of the decrease in risk-averse
behavior, moral hazard increases costs.
6 4
A well-known example of moral. hazard involves insured medical
patients' overconsumption of health care services: An insured pa-
tient may visit the doctor more often than an uninsured one,
simply because the immediate personal cost to do so is less to the
insured than to the uninsured patient who must pay "out of
pocket" for each visit. The end result, however, is that the patient's
changed behavior is based on the presence of insurance that was
intended to reduce overall costs, but which ironically will increase
the medical costs borne, not only by the insured patient, but by all
participants in the health care system. Insurance makes the patient
more prone to act as a hypochondriac, visiting the doctor more
often than he would absent insurance, and thus increasing utiliza-
tion and overall costs to care for that patient. The example of an
insured patient describes how moral hazard results in overcon-
sumption of resources.
Another paradigmatic moral hazard problem involves insured
property owners who exercise suboptimal care over their property.
When a car owner is insured against losses due to theft, she may
not bother to lock her car doors, purchase an alarm, or choose
well-lit locations when parking in a high crime area. The same car
owner, if uninsured, will exercise more care to prevent automobile
theft, in order to avoid the personal cost of replacing her car if it is
damaged or stolen. 6 In this case, the car owner's expectation that
insurance coverage will pay for any losses due to theft decreases the
care the insured automobile owner takes to prevent costly crimes,
even though the insurance contract was intended to reduce costs.
The example of the careless automobile owner provides an
illustration of how moral hazard causes a suboptimal exercise of
caution..6 The thesis of this section of the Article is that moral haz-
ard can also describe the ways in which the Government changes
63. Rickerford v. Westchester Fire Ins. Co., 186 So. 109 (La. Ct. App. 1939), reinstated
on reh'g by, 187 So. 676 (La. Ct. App. 1939); see LEE R. Russ & THOMAS F. SEGALLA, COUCH
ON INSURANCE § 81:98 (3d ed. 2005) ("The term 'moral hazard' means a substantial hazard,
one that would influence the conduct of a reasonable person, as distinguished from a mere
psychological or ethical risk.... [S]uch as to sustain a holding that the insured would suffer
less by a destruction of the property than would ordinarily be the case in the absence of its
breach." (emphasis added)).
64. See COOTER & ULEN, supra note 62, at 50 ("Moral hazard arises when the behavior
of the insuree [sic] changes after the purchase of insurance so that the probability of loss or
the size of the loss increases.").
65. See SHERMAN FOLLAND, ALLEN GOODMAN & MIRON STANOM, THE ECONOMICS OF
HEALTH AND HEALTH CARE 153 n.3 (4th ed. 2004).
66. Id.
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its behavior when private enforcers-specifically, qui tam relators-
are present. The moral hazard impact of private enforcers causes
both the overconsumption of enforcement resources, and a subop-
timal exercise of prosecutorial discretion or care on the part of the
Government.67 Here is how the analogy works:
When a qui tam relator prosecutes the Government's false claims
case, the Government acts as an insured party. The presence of the
private plaintiff in relator-directed FCA cases insures the Govern-
ment from the costs associated with initiating litigation, pursuing
discovery, generating and responding to pre-trial motions, and di-
rectly bearing the risk of failure if the claim proves frivolous or
specious. Instead of incurring these costs, the Government may
rely upon the relator, who is motivated to search out and investi-
gate potentially lucrative allegations of fraud by the generous
rewards available under the FCA, 8 to absorb these costs by prose-
cuting on the Government's behalf. In a real sense then, the
Government spreads its prosecutorial risk to private qui tam plain-
tiffs. However, to the extent that the private plaintiff does not
discriminate between worthy and frivolous claims the way the Gov-
ernment would, for reasons discussed below, moral hazard will
increase the number and decrease the quality of anti-fraud cases
prosecuted.
Moral hazard causes the Government to make different prosecu-
torial decisions because of the presence of the qui tam relator, than
it would otherwise make in the absence of the insurance provided
by the private plaintiff. Because of the presence of qui tam relators,
the Government prosecutes or allows the relator to prosecute ex-
cessive numbers of FCA cases that the Government alone would
not bring. When forced to allocate scarce enforcement resources,
the Government will carefully choose the strongest cases to pursue;
these are cases with credible witnesses, firm evidence, and color-
able theories of recovery. However, because the Government's
investment in spurious qui tam suits is minimal, 69 and the potential
payoff is sizeable, ° the Government will behave opportunistically
67. See Tom Baker, On the Genealogy of Moral Hazard, 75 TEX. L. REv. 237, 274 (1996)
(providing an excellent discussion of several additional "multiple" problems of moral haz-
ard).
68. See 31 U.S.C. § 3729 (a) (2000). A qui tam plaintiff may receive between fifteen and
thirty percent of trebled damages proved and of fines between $5,500 and $11,000 per
fraudulent claim, plus expenses including attorneys fees.
69. The Government does bear some minimal monitoring costs. Some argument can
also be made that the more the Government entertains frivolous suits, the more it signals a
willingness to participate in specious litigation, thus inviting an increase in the number of
cases that it has to monitor but would not pursue.
70. The Government may intervene the more likely settlement appears.
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and allow the relator to prosecute excessive numbers of FCA cases,
regardless of their merit.
Moreover, the Government, as a result of moral hazard, exer-
cises suboptimal caution in selecting legal theories, which
arguments to make, and which strategies to employ. There is no
immediate payoff for monitoring the quality of qui tam cases that
proceed independently. The Government imagines it has nothing
to loose even if these cases fail because all immediate costs of failed
cases under the FCA are borne by the private plaintiff. Thus, in the
face of weak monitoring incentives, the Government will allow
cases based on weak facts or even unfounded or experimental
theories of recovery to proceed. Nothing is immediately lost to the
Government for this carelessness. Most cases settle before the
weakness of the relator's theory can be tested, or cases are dis-
missed with minimal monitoring costs imposed on the
Government. The cases that are tried may not be tried in time to
establish the strength of allegations beneath the FCA claim. Often
they are novel and no precedent serves to guide the Government's
discretion. In either event, the Government may rely on the qui tam
relator to incur the vast majority of litigation costs for frivolous as
well as worthy claims and so the Government makes little attempt
to distinguish the two.
Once a qui tam plaintiff files an action under the FCA, the Gov-
ernment is protected against two eventualities. First, it is protected
against the cost that the charged fraud will go undetected. Second,
the Government is protected against the costs of prosecuting the
alleged fraud even if the allegations are frivolous. The Government
then has assurance that whether it intervenes or not, the relator's
self-interest will cause the case to be prosecuted, at minimum, with
the zeal that is warranted by the relator's expectation of earning a
thirty percent share of the proceeds from the case. This, it turns
out, is enough zeal to allow the Government to rely perhaps too
easily on the relator's decisions and prosecutorial strategies. In-
stead of investing the resources to come up with its own theories,
or, at least to test those proposed by the relator, the Government
can pursue multiple untested cases with minimal effort. The Gov-
ernment is not required to test the credibility of the witnesses
(including the relator) when it declines to intervene. Absent inter-
vention, the Government may not confirm the soundness of
documentary evidence or the support for allegations. This
71. Arguably, the Government's calculus is incomplete because it does not take into
account the social costs of allowing to proceed litigation that is likely to be unproductive.
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suboptimal exercise of care allows the Government to take on (or
allow) prosecution of cases that well may be weakly supported,
poorly reasoned and therefore of limited value as either a legal
precedent or as a signal to future actors who wish to avoid engag-
ing in fraudulent conduct. When such cases proceed, the public
good is not served. In this way the moral hazard incentives have the
same impact here as in any other case of an insured party. Moral
hazard results in the Government relying on its insurance, in the
form of a qui tam relator, to allow it to exercise too little care while
taking on too many cases.
Before going further, a note about one simplifying assumption is
in order. Here, the moral hazard model presents only two possible
choices for the Government. Either the Government can prosecute
an FCA case on its own, or it can risk the moral hazard of allowing
a qui tam plaintiff to prosecute independently on its behalf. In fact,
many more choices exist for the Government between these two
extremes. Just as an insured may reduce the impact of moral haz-
ard by choosing to incrementally increase the level of care
exercised,72 the Government could choose to monitor more closely,
intervene earlier, or even to conduct a comprehensive evaluation
of each case and dismiss the frivolous ones at the earliest possible
opportunity. However, the model here offers only a binary choice
for two reasons. First, this simplification more closely reflects the
statutory reality. Under the FCA, there is little reason for the Gov-
ernment to choose any of the moral hazard mitigating behavior
listed above. Secondly, the binary simplification appears to more
closely reflect the empirical reality. Recall the startling trend to-
ward privatization and the increased numbers of privately filed
FCA suits. The sheer volume of these cases suggests the Govern-
ment is choosing between two extremes.
Having laid out the basic structure of the moral hazard analogy,
the theory offers some useful principles about how to address the
problems caused by moral hazard. Economists describe moral haz-
ard as the "rational response to economic incentives brought about
by the elasticity of demand to the price of care."7 - Assume FCA
cases represent investment opportunities for the Government.
7 4
72. For example, in the face of a $1000 deductible, the insured automobile owner will
exercise more care and mitigate the effects of moral hazard more effectively than the owner
might in the face of a $200 deductible. The owner need not be relieved of one hundred
percent of the costs to be subject to moral hazard.
73. See FoLLAND, GOODMAN & STANOM, supra note 65, at 153.
74. This analogy makes sense because the Government does not begin a lawsuit know-
ing what its return will be. Like an investor, the Government chooses to expend funds on a
somewhat uncertain enterprise.
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When the Government determines how many cases it will prose-
cute, it is making an investment decision about unknown future
events. Thus, the Government's demand for FCA cases is a func-
tion of the price (or the litigation costs) associated with each
prosecutorial decision, and the expected benefits the Government
will receive from the case. As the cost of prosecuting a given case
increases, the Government's demand for that case will generally
decrease. This describes a normal, downward-sloping demand
curve for cases. However, for some FCA cases, where the expected
benefit is greater, the Government's demand curve is steeper.
Some cases will be so potentially lucrative or otherwise attractive to
the Government that the Government will prosecute (or invest in)
those cases at all costs. For example, the Government may focus
attention on prosecuting a particularly egregious fraudulent
scheme that has impact on a vulnerable group. 5 Call these the
"high stakes cases." In these instances, the Government's demand
for such cases is inelastic and the danger of moral hazard is mini-
mal. In all other cases-say the "regular cases"-the Government's
demand for FCA cases is more elastic and the danger of moral haz-
ard is present.
The solution economists propose to mitigate the danger of
moral hazard is to insure only those goods for which the insured's
demand is inelastic. In the FCA context, applying this solution
would require the Government to declare that its interest in cer-
tain FCA cases is inelastic, before the Government may rely wholly
on the qui tam relator to prosecute the case. If the law required the
Government to first establish its own assessment and basis for
prosecuting each case before allowing qui tam relators to control its
litigation, then the risks and resulting costs of moral hazard might
be controlled.
B. Understanding the Costs of Moral Hazard
Moral hazard costs include the loss associated with imprudently
wasting scarce Government enforcement resources, the risk of
compromising socially important goals, the imposition of unneces-
sary litigation costs on parties to excessive litigation, the risk of
establishing unclear or affirmatively bad legal precedent, and the
risk of sending mixed deterrence signals to other providers and
75. See, e.g., United States v. NHC Healthcare Corp., 115 F. Supp. 2d 1149 (W.D. Mo.
2000).
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manufacturers who may be targeted as FCA defendants in the fu-
ture. To understand how excessive costs are generated by moral
hazard, consider Kenneth Arrow's observation that moral hazard
occurs when an insured party who benefits from insurance has
control over the events that give rise to insured losses. 
6
Again, the analogous party to an insured in the FCA context is
the Government. The events that give rise to losses are the statu-
tory precautions that the Government could, but fails to, exercise
under the current law. The FCA currently permits the Government
to choose not to monitor closely or select carefully where frivolous
lawsuits are concerned. This is the same as the property owner who
retains control but does not exercise care with his property, failing
to take steps to prevent fires (install smoke detectors) or theft
(park where well lit). The laissez faire choices of both the Govern-
ment and the insured property owner give rise to preventable
losses due to fire, theft and frivolous FCA claims, respectively. The
more insurance protection is available, the greater the insured's
reliance on coverage will be. Sherry Glied describes this phenome-
non as "dynamic moral hazard" because as insurance increases, the
insured party engages in increasingly more costly behavior, on the
assumption that insurance will pay for the increased costs." We
have seen that as FCA prosecution becomes increasingly privatized,
the Government appears to permit more and more costly claims to
proceed.7s
A final method for understanding the costs imposed by moral
hazard in FCA litigation is to compare the distinctive cost curves
faced by the Government and qui tam relators.79 When the Gov-
ernment sues a defendant pharmaceutical company under the
FCA, whether directly, or by a qui tam plaintiff, the Government
stands to benefit from the prosecution. The Government expects
certain public policy benefits such as curbing illegal conduct, de-
terring future wrong-doing, and recovering misspent public
dollars. Indeed, health care-related civil fraud recoveries in 2005
76. Kenneth J. Arrow, Uncertainty and the Welfare Economics of Medical Care, 53 Am. ECON.
REv. 942, 961 (1963), reprinted in 26J. HEALTH POL. POL'Y & L. 851,871 (2001).
77. See Sherry A. Glied, Health Insurance and Market Failure Since Arrow, 26 J. HEALTH
POL. POL'Y & L. 957, 964 (explaining that ever more costly medical technology develops in
response to the availability of insurance to pay for the new products, regardless of the new
products' cost or marginal utility).
78. See supra Tables 1 & 2.
79. Here it is important to specify who precisely is the object of the term, "the Gov-
ernment." The active participant in FCA litigation enforcement is "the Government"
referred to here. This branch of the government is distinguishable from entities such as the
CMS who may be beneficiaries of the enforcement effort. Throughout this discussion, "the
Government" is the actor who prosecutes fraud, either at the federal or state level, with or
without the qui tam relator.
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alone totaled over $1.1 billion. ° Additionally, the Government will
obtain some financial benefit from prosecuting fraud. Over the
past five years, the Government has recovered $5.7 billion in set-
lements and judgments from health care corporations under the
FCA.8' The vast majority of these recoveries (eighty-three percent)8"
are returned to the Medicare Trust Fund to administer that pro-
gram in future years. The remaining, smaller percentage is
awarded to the Government's enforcement agencies for future
prosecutions of health care fraud. Therefore, when the Govern-
ment assesses the benefits of prosecuting false claims, it primarily
considers benefits that accrue to the public good. These include
the satisfaction of stopping fraud, deterring fraud, returning funds
to the taxpayers, and the political advantages the Government ob-
tains by increasing its fraud enforcement success. An individual
Government prosecutor may receive a raise, promotion, accolade,
or other benefit from having successfully participated in obtaining
an FCA recovery, but for the most part the FCA recovery does not
directly turn into purchasing power for the Government's individ-
ual prosecutor. Although the Government must also consider its
tangible cash benefits that flow directly from its certified share of
financial recoveries, the Government's interests in serving the pub-
lic good are relatively large when compared to the smaller, direct
financial benefits received by qui tam relators who are successful
plaintiffs in FCA cases. The reverse is true for the qui tam relator.
A qui tam relator who obtains a $1 million share of any recovery
obtained or earned from a target corporation will receive the di-
rect and individual financial benefit of each dollar of the recovery
amount. The relator may save this money, spend it, or otherwise
purchase gratification with her award. A smaller percentage of the
qui tam relator's benefits are intangible and directed toward public
welfare. The plaintiff derives some satisfaction from stopping and
deterring fraud, and from being helpful to the Government. How-
ever, the largest benefit to a qui tam plaintiff is from the financial
share he receives when funds are recovered. For this reason, the
immediate and direct financial benefit received by individual qui
tam relators when they make a prosecutorial decision largely over-
whelms the indirect benefit the relator derives from serving the
80. See BOESE, supra note 11, at H-3.
81. See MEYER REPORT, supra note 58.
82. See id. This number was calculated by aggregating the four-year total returns to the
Medicare Trust Fund of $3.346 billion and the four-year aggregate of total returns in health
care recoveries from 1999 to 2002 of $4 billion, and then dividing the first number by the
second.
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public good. On the other hand, the immediate and direct finan-
cial gain to the Government prosecutor is minor, when compared
to the larger benefit of serving the public good. Thus, when the
Government independently selects cases to prosecute, it is moti-
vated only in small part by the potential for direct financial gains,
and motivated more directly by its proportionately larger duty to
serve the public good. Private plaintiffs do not select the same type
or number of FCA cases to pursue as the Government would; the
public mission is unlikely to be at the core of the qui tam plaintiffs
motivation to prosecute. To the extent, then, that privatization re-
sults in the Government following the private plaintiffs'
prosecutorial choices instead of its own, the Government is likely
to harm the public good.
Now with the moral hazard theoretical model in place, the next
step is to examine a set of real life public-private prosecutions in
order to determine whether the theory of moral hazard is borne
out by the facts. The next section focuses on one category of FCA
cases in particular-pharmaceutical fraud-to seek evidence of the
moral hazard effect of privatization. Pharmaceutical fraud is a tar-
get for Government prosecution so there are a number of cases to
examine and the FCA data about them is readily available. The ex-
amples from private-public enforcement in this area are most likely
examples that can be duplicated across many other industries and
many other examples of public enforcement through private at-
torneys general.
III. THE "REAL LIFE" IMPACT OF MORAL HAZARD IN GOVERNMENT
ENFORCEMENT IN PHARMACEUTICAL FRAUD CASES
The Department ofJustice is committed to enforcing the FCA in
order to reduce the substantial number of Medicare and Medicaid
dollars the American people pay annually to finance fraudulent
health care schemes.83 This is a worthy goal.84 It is also clear that the
pharmaceutical industry is the most recent and intense focus of the
83. See Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Justice Dept. Civil Fraud Recoveries Total
$2.1 Billion for FY 2003: False Claims Act Recoveries Exceed $12 Billion Since 1986 (Nov.
10, 2003), http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/2003/November/03civ_-613.htm (last visited Oct.
1, 2006) (on file with the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform) [hereinafter Press
Release, DOJ, Nov. 10, 2003].
84. Estimates are that ten percent of the nation's health care expenditures are paid to
reimburse fraud. Joan Krause, A Conceptual Model of Health Care Fraud Enforcement, 12J.L. &
POL'Y 55, 55 (2003).
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Government's anti-fraud campaign."5 One can easily see why. The
pharmaceutical industry accounts for approximately ten percent
of all health care expenditures in the United States."' The indus-
try's net sales and operating revenues for the year 2003 averaged
$58.927 billion. 7 Moreover, the pharmaceutical industry is about
to be injected with an unprecedented flow of additional revenues
to be paid by the federal Government. The largest reform in
Medicare and Medicaid since 1965 became law on December 8,
2003. On that date, President Bush signed the Medicare Prescrip-
tion Drug Improvement and Modernization Act of 2003,8 a law
that will expand the Medicare program's reimbursement for pre-
scription drug purchases by at least $534 billion over the next ten
years. By some estimates, the cost of this program could be as
much as $1.2 trillion.90 This new law represents the largest expan-
sion in Medicare's history and importantly increases mandatory
85. See, e.g., U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS. & THE DEP'T OFJUSTICE, HEALTH
CARE FRAUD AND ABUSE CONTROL PROGRAM: ANNUAL REPORT FOR FY 2003 (Dec. 2004),
http://www.usdoj.gov/dag/pubdo/hcfacreport2OO3.htm (on file with the University of
Michigan Journal of Law Reform) [hereinafter HEALTH CARE FRAUD ANNUAL REPORT 2003]
("The HHS/OIG recommended that CMS work with states to pursue more efficient means
of purchasing pharmaceuticals and initiate a review of the Medicaid rebate program ....");
U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., & THE DEP'T OFJUSTICE, HEALTH CARE FRAUD &
ABUSE CONTROL PROGRAM: ANNUAL REPORT FOR FY 2002 (Sept. 2003), http://
www.usdoj.gov/dag/pubdoc/hcfacreport2002.htm (on file with the University of Michigan
Journal of Law Reform) ("HHS/OIG estimated that the Medicaid program could have saved
as much as $1.6 billion in 1999 for the top 200 brand and generic drugs if reimbursements
had been made suing [sic] the lower [prices]."); U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., &
THE DEP'T OFJUSTICE, HEALTH CARE FRAUD & ABUSE CONTROL PROGRAM: ANNUAL REPORT
FOR FY 2001 (Apr. 2002), http://www.usdoj.gov/dag/pubdoc/hipaa01fel9.htm (on file with
the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform) ("In Medicare, HHS/OIG studies span-
ning the last 4 years have revealed that Medicare and its beneficiaries pay considerably more
than do other Federal health care programs for prescription drugs.... The HHS/OIG rec-
ommended that CMS continue to seek administrative and legislative remedies to reduce
excessive drug reimbursement .... ).
86. Annual U.S. health expenditures are estimated to reach $1.9 trillion in 2005. See
TOMMY G. THOMPSON, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS. ET AL., HEALTH, UNITED
STATES, 2004: WITH CHARTBOOK ON TRENDS IN THE HEALTH OF AMERICANS 4 (2004).
87. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, 3 QUARTERLY FINANCIAL REPORT
FOR MANUFACTURING, MINING, AND TRADE CORPORATIONS: 2003 100 (2003).
88. Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003, Pub.
L. No. 108-173, § 101, 117 Stat. 2066, 2071 (2003). Ironically, this statute also contains provi-
sions making FCA prosecution of pharmaceutical companies easier for plaintiffs. Id. at Title
III, §§ 301-03.
89. See OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, DEP'T OF
HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS. at "Medicare Advantage Enrollment" (2005), http://
www.whitehouse.gov/omb/budget/fy2005/hhs.html (on file with the University of Michi-
ganjournal of Law Reform).
90. See Ceci Connolly & Mike Allen, Medicare Drug Benefit may Cost $1.2 Trillion, WASH.
POST, Feb. 9, 2005, at Al.
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Government payments for prescription drugs exponentially be-
tween now and 2015.91
The result of a large and largely unregulated industry,92 poised
to receive enormous infusions of the federal money, earmarked by
a massive reform statute for mandatory payment to Medicare ven-
dors, who must pay treble damages if their billings are found to be
fraudulent, and where up to one third of those trebled damages
might be paid to private parties who file claims that allege im-
proper billing for prescription drugs is not surprisingly a boon for
potential private plaintiffs. Some have called it "the perfect
storm."93
The Government has collected $1.6 billion from pharmaceutical
firms in settlements and judgments over the last three years.94 An-
other $600 million in criminal penalties has been collected from
defendant drug companies during the same period.95 The over-
whelming majority of these reported cases have involved a qui tam
relator; few were initiated by the Government alone. 96 It is clear
that the Government could not prosecute these large, lucrative
FCA cases against pharmaceutical companies without the help of
qui tam relators. The cases allege complex schemes of pricing,
marketing, and payment schemes for which insider information is
crucial.97 However, where the FCA statute contemplates a prosecu-
torial effort led and directed by the Government,98 instead, private
plaintiffs appear to be directing the Government's exercises of
91. In the year 2000, Americans spent $132 billion on prescription drugs. See Andrew
Harris, Recent Congressional Responses to Demands for Affordable Pharmaceuticals, 16 Loy. CON-
SUMER L. REv. 219, 223 (2004).
92. See Daniel Higgins & Sandra Golze, OIG to Pharmaceutical Companies: Nearly all Mar-
keting Incentives Suspect; Between the Lines, a Caution to Doctors, Hospitals and GPOs, 11 HEALTH
L. REP. 41, at 1485 (2002) (citing the HHS Inspector General Janet Rehnquist's "Compli-
ance Program Guidance for Pharmaceutical Manufacturers," Draft, 67 Fed. Reg. 62057
(2002), which referred to "ill-fitting regulations" that make the pharmaceutical industry a
difficult one for the government to provide prospective guidance).
93. Terry Carter, Drug Wars: Coalition Tactics Make Price Fight Look Like Battle over Tobacco,
88 A.B.A. J. 41, 41 (2002) ("Like so many weather fronts and patterns coming together in
one place at the same time, this 'perfect storm' over prescription drug prices is made up of
public opinion, consumer groups, regulators, criminal investigators, politicians and plain-
tiffs lawyers.").




98. See, e.g., 31 U.S.C. § 3730 (b) (1) (2000) (defining the central role of the Govern-
ment in a qui tam action from its inception to its conclusion: "A person may bring a civil
action for a violation of section 3729 for the person and for the United States Government. The
action shall be brought in the name of the Government. The action may be dismissed only if the
court and the Attorney General give written consent to the dismissal and their reasons for consent-
ing." (emphasis added)).
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prosecutorial discretion, for example, choosing what actions to ini-
tiate and determining what theories of recovery to advance against
target defendants. The Government's recently failed case against
TAP Pharmaceutical executives is an example of how the Govern-
ment is ceding, if not losing control of FCA prosecution.
A. The Tap Pharmaceutical Prosecution
Tap Pharmaceuticals (TAP) is a joint venture between Abbott
Laboratories and Takeda Chemical Industries of Japan."m TAP
manufactures the prostate cancer drug Leuprorelin Acetate under
the name Lupron in the United States and under the name
Prostap in the United Kingdom.'0 0 Lupron is used by physicians
and, therefore, reimbursed under Medicare, Part B.''
Two qui tam relators initiated FCA suits against TAP, sometime
around 1996. Former Vice President for Sales at TAP Douglas Du-
rand and urologist Dr. Joseph Gerstein, alleged in independent
actions that the company engaged in three basic fraudulent pric-
ing and marketing schemes to sell Lupron. First, the relators
charged that TAP fraudulently set and controlled Medicare reim-
bursement rates for Lupron by inflating the Average Wholesale
Price (AWP) it reported for the prescription drug. The AWP is a
series of rates generated by the pharmaceutical industry, and pub-
lished by independent publishing companies that compile data
annually to report the average prices of pharmaceutical products.
Although these numbers are self-reported by the industry, the AWP
provides the base number upon which the Federal Government
calculates its percentage share of the reimbursement amount that
providers will receive under Medicare, Part B for the drugs that
they prescribe. 2 Durand alleged that TAP committed fraud under
99. Mary Ann Liebert, On The Move, 24 BIOTECHNOLOGY L. REP. 59, 59 (2005); Press
Release, U.S. Dep't of JusticeJustice Department Recovers Over $1 Billion in FY 2002 (Dec.
16, 2002), http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/2002/December/02_civ720.htm (on file with the
University of MichiganJournal of Law Reform).
100. David L. Douglass & Olabisi A. Onisile, Pharmaceutical Marketing Practices: Providers
Beware, 16 HEALTH L. 6, 31 (2004); see David Spurgeon, Companies May Face Tighter Regulation
over Promoting Drugs, 329 BRIT. MED.J. 998 (Oct. 30, 2004).
101. Medicare, Part B, reimburses providers for the cost of certain prescription drugs
that are administered by physicians directly to patients. The Government will reimburse
providers up to eighty percent of the allowable cost of these prescription drugs. Beneficiar-
ies must pay the remaining twenty percent of the cost of these drugs. Both percentage
shares are based upon the self-reported AWP that industry pharmaceutical companies pro-
vide annually. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 13956 (West Supp. 2006).
102. Id.
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the FCA by violating the Prescription Drug Marketing Act
(PDMA) °3 when the pharmaceutical manufacturer marketed the
spread between the discounted price physicians paid for Lupron
and the inflated AWP it reported for purposes of Medicare reim-
bursement. This alleged scheme allowed physicians to pay a lower
price for prescription drugs, but then receive a higher Medicare
reimbursement for the cost of those drugs based on the inflated
AWP. 
°
Durand and Gerstein also alleged that TAP violated the federal
anti-kickback laws'05 by giving gifts and grants to induce physicians
to switch from competitors' drugs to Lupron.11 Finally, the relators
alleged that TAP committed fraud when it provided free samples of
Lupron to physicians, knowing that those physicians would bill
Medicare and Medicaid to collect reimbursements for these free
drugs. °7 Durand and Gernstein alleged TAP's fraudulent conduct
extended over several years.'0 8 If proved, their allegations would
have exposed the manufacturer to trebled damages for each physi-
cian's claim for reimbursement for Lupron, throughout the multi-
year period. In 2003 alone, TAP's U.S. Lupron sales totaled $788
million and its overseas sales totaled $183 million.'0 9 Thus, TAP's
exposure in this claim was enormous.
In October 2001, TAP pled guilty to conspiracy to violation of
the Prescription Drug Manufacturing Act and agreed to pay $875
million, the largest health fraud settlement in U.S. history, to re-
solve criminal and civil fraud allegations against it."0 TAP paid
103. See Prescription Drug Marketing Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-293, 102 Stat. 95
(1988) (amending sections 331, 333, 353 and 381 of the Food Drug and Cosmetic Act, 21
U.S.C. § 301, to "place restrictions on the distribution of drug samples, to ban certain resales
of drugs by hospitals and other health care entities, and for other purposes").
104. Marc J. Scheineson & Shannon T. Kinger, Lessons from Expanded Government En-
forcement Efforts Against Drug Companies, 60 FOOD & DRUG LJ. 1, 8 (2005).
105. 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(b) (2000). The anti-kickback statute is a criminal statute that
prohibits transactions that intentionally induce patient referrals in exchange for remunera-
tion.
106. For example, the qui tam complaints alleged that TAP offered Dr. Joseph Gerstein
$65,000 to reverse his decision to switch from TAP's product Lupron to Zoladex, manufac-
tured by AstraZeneca, an apparently lower-cost competitor to the TAP product. See Press
Release, U.S. Dep't ofJustice, TAP Pharmaceutical Products Inc. and Seven Others Charged
with Health Care Crimes; Company Agrees to Pay $875 Million to Settle Charges (Oct. 3,
2001), http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/2001/October/513civ.htm (on file with the Univer-
sity of MichiganJournal of Law Reform) [hereinafter Press Release, DOJ, Oct. 3, 2001].
107. See Douglass & Onisile, supra note 100, at 32.
108. See Press Release, DOJ, Oct. 3, 2001, supra note 106.
109. See Product Portfolio: Lupron Depot/Lucrin, ESPICOM Pharmaceutical & Medical
Company Profiles (Apr. 2004) ((on file with the University of Michigan Journal of Law Re-
form), available at Westlaw, PHARMEDPROF Database.
110. Huge Settlement Announced in TAP Pharmaceutical Case, HEALTH CARE FRAUD &
ABUSE NEWSL. (L.J. Newsl., NewYork, N.Y.), Oct. 2001, at 1.
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criminal fines of $290 million, $559.5 million to settle FCA claims,
and $22.5 million to settle state law claims."' TAP also agreed to
enter into a corporate integrity agreement, requiring the company
to report its AWPs to Medicare and Medicaid under supervision.
' 2
The qui tam relators in this case, Durand and Dr. Gerstein received
$77.9 million and $17 million, respectively, as their share of the
settlement proceeds, plus attorneys' fees and costs."' At settlement,
none of the three underlying allegations against TAP had been
proved. However, a criminal trial on the merits of the underlying
fraud claims followed.
On the same day that FCA settlement with TAP was announced,
the Government filed separate criminal charges against eleven in-
dividual TAP executives allegedly responsible for engaging in the
fraudulent conduct that was the basis for the now settled FCA
case."4 The Government's star witness was the qui tam relator,
Douglas Durand."5 Durand and Gernstein testified during the
criminal trial that lasted from April 11, 2004' I6 to July 2004 when a
Boston jury returned an unequivocal "not guilty" verdict in favor of
the TAP executives." 7 Apparently, the private relators' testimony
did not convince jurors that TAP executives had committed crimi-
nal fraud."8 First, charges were dropped against three TAP
executive defendants, either for insufficient evidence or due to
"undisclosed health reasons. ' "9 Then the Court dismissed the anti-
kickback charges entirely, also reversing one defendant's guilty
plea, because the court held that as a matter of law, the defendants
could not have committed the alleged anti-kickback crimes where
111. Id.
112. See Press Release, DOJ, Oct. 3, 2001, supra note 106.
113. Huge Settlement Announced in 7AP Pharmaceutical Case, supra note 110.
114. See Weinberg, supra at note 13, at 90; Press Release, DOJ, Oct. 3, 2001, supra note
106.
115. See Matthew Arnold, Federal Court Acquits TAP Employees of Kickback Charges, MED.
MARKETING & MEDIA, Aug. 2004, at 11.
116. Defense Makes Closing Argument in Trial of Drug Company Employees, OBESITY, FITNESS
& WELLNESS WE., July 31, 2004, at 708.
117. See Matthew Arnold, supra note 115; see a/soJAMES D. WAREHAM & CANDICE S.
SHEPHERD, GEORGETOWN UNIV. LAW CTR. CONTINUING LEGAL EDUC., MANAGING WHISTLE-
BLOWER CLAIMS UNDER THE FALSE CLAIMS ACT, (Mar. 10-11, 2005), 2005 WL 1611863;
Alice Dembner, 7AP Officials on Trial Today In Fraud Case, BOSTON GLOBE, Apr. 20, 2004, at
Al; Alice Dembner, TAP Trial Jurors say Proof was Lacking: Enough Doubt Seen for Acquittals,
BOSTON GLOBE, July 27, 2004, at B1 [hereinafter Dembner, TAP 7Hal Jurors say Proof was
Lacking].
118. Dembner, 7AP 7ialJurors say Proof was Lacking: Enough Doubt Seen for Acquittals, su-
pra note 117.
119. Defense Makes Closing Argument in 7ial of Drug Company Employees, supra note 116, at
708.
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HMOs were concerned. 20 Next, if reports about the case that ap-
peared in the popular business press are credited, the private qui
tam relators' underlying factual story fell apart. The evidence
showed that payments alleged to physicians were never made, and
overcharges allegedly sent to Medicare did not actually take
place. 121 In the end, jurors simply did not believe the evidence was
sufficient to support a criminal conviction. The foreman said,
"there was enough doubt that you couldn't send somebody to
jail."22
The jury verdict for the defense in the TAP litigation provides
one illustration of private litigants directing public prosecution in a
way that serves their personal interests but harms the public good.
While we know the substantial extent to which the private parties'
financial interests were served by this litigation, we are left some-
what baffled by the Government's passivity as this saga unfolded.
One might legitimately question the extent to which the Govern-
ment paid attention to the social goals of the underlying statutes
which include restricting prescription drug re-sales prohibited by
the PDMA and containing overutilization of health care resources
via enforcement of the Medicare Anti-Kickback statute. One won-
ders why the Government did not foresee the weakness of the
relators' claims in advance of the criminal trial, the plea bargains,
and the lucrative settlement agreement. Did the Government rely
so completely on the financially self-interested qui tam relators that
it risked building its case upon fabricated testimony? We cannot
really know what the Government prosecutors were thinking at the
time, but we do know enough to examine why the Government be-
haved as it did.
We do know the charges that provided the basis for the largest
health care fraud settlement in U.S. history were not proven be-
yond a reasonable doubt. Notwithstanding the obvious difference
between the standards of proof required in criminal and civil cases,
the jury's decision in the criminal case does cast a shadow on the
strength of the civil qui tam case. Yet the private relators convinced
the Government to bring an action that resulted in enormous set-
tlement concessions from defendants for whom litigation becomes
financially unfeasible. We know that the relators' allegations
proved potent enough to deprive the defendants not only of
money, but three physician defendants pled guilty to criminal
charges to settle the allegations of wrong-doing against them. And
120. See'Weinberg, supra note 13, at 90.
121. Id.
122. See Dembner, TAP TrialJurors say Proof was Lacking, supra note 117.
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yet the story Mr. Durand told the jury was not potent to convince
them to convict. Therefore, it does not seem likely that the Gov-
ernment chose to not intervene in this claim solely on the strength
of the relator's underlying case, because the relator's claims were
strong enough to stand on their own without Government inter-
vention.
In qui tam-directed litigation, the strength of the underlying
claims may not drive the settlement negotiations. Instead, the Gov-
ernment's responsibility to examine relators' assertions and control
the prosecution of public cases appears to have been influenced by
the magnitude of possible recoveries-for both the private and
public enforcers-and the willingness of the qui tam relator to pur-
sue these recoveries with or without the Government's
intervention. The irony is that this incentive structure is not cost-
less. For example, TAP found out too late that Durand's story
could not convince a jury; the defendants had already written the
check and "done the time." Also, despite the size of the Govern-
ment's financial investment in this prosecution, the outcome does
little to advance the cost-containment goals Congress had in
enacting the relevant public laws. Durand, on the other hand, after
six-plus years meeting and working with federal investigators and
attorneys, collected his $77.9 million and moved to Florida to re-
tire with his family.23 But not before he filed another qui tam action
against a second pharmaceutical company, AstraZeneca Pharma-
ceuticals, L.P., alleging almost identical charges and claims.1
24
While we do not know whether Mr. Durand's allegations against
AstraZeneca will prove any more convincing at trial, we do know
that Mr. Durand was paid another $47.5 million for his work on the
AstraZeneca case.125
TAP is not the first or only case that the Government has settled
first and then tried in related proceedings only to find that the
FCA allegations proved insufficient to support a criminal
126conviction. Caremark, a pharmacy benefits management firm,
123. See Huge Settlement Announced in TAP Pharmaceutical Case, supra note 110.
124. See infra Part llI.B (discussing the AstraZeneca facts).
125. Jonathan K. Henderson & Quintin Cassady, Drug Deals in 2006: Cutting Edge Legal
and Regulatory Issues in the Pharmaceutical Industry, 15 ANNALS HEALTH L. 107, 121 (2006);
Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, AstraZeneca Pharmaceuticals LP Pleads Guilty to
Healthcare Crime; Company Agrees to Pay $355 Million to Settle Charges (June 20, 2003),
http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/2003/June/03 civ-371.htm (on file with the University of
Michigan Journal of Law Reform) [hereinafter Press Release, DOJ, June 20, 2003]; see also
AstraZeneca Pays $355 Million to Settle False-Claims Case, 5 ANDREWS GUN INDUS. LITIG. REP.
No. 8, at 28 (Dec. 26, 2003).
126. See infra Part III.D (discussing PBM's and their market role).
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paid $161 million before its employees were exonerated of wrong-
doing.127 Blue Cross Blue Shield of Illinois also paid $144 million
before learning in a related trial that the basis of the FCA suit it
settled would not withstand scrutiny. 28 In each of these cases, de-
fendants admitted criminal liability for conduct that ultimately
proved not to be criminal at all. In each instance, the Government
paid the cost of prosecuting the relator-directed case.29 In each
case, no reported legal determination serves to clarify the parame-
ters of permissible conduct for future market participants. This
approach to enforcement raises important questions about the so-
cial impact of incurring substantial enforcement costs in cases of
uncertain substantive strength. Ideally, the Government is ac-
countable for weighing the social costs and benefits of each case.
However, the privatization trend calls this into question. The TAP
litigation is not an isolated example of a case in which the Gov-
ernment's oversight may have been compromised by privatization.
The next section surveys several recent pharmaceutical fraud
prosecutions to illustrate other costs imposed by this trend.
B. Government Inaction Invites Litigation
About the same time that he initiated the TAP litigation dis-
cussed above, Mr. Durand filed another qui tam action in the U.S.
District Court for the District of Delaware against AstraZeneca
Pharmaceuticals, LP (AstraZeneca), another pharmaceutical
manufacturer and marketer. 30 This qui tam action alleged that
from January 1991 through December 2002, AstraZeneca engaged
in conduct that violated the FCA in the manufacturing and market-
ing of its anti-prostate cancer drug, Zoladex. 3' The Complaint
alleged three types of violations. 32 First, AstraZeneca was charged
with inducing physicians to purchase Zoladex by offering illegal
remunerations in the form of free samples, unrestricted educa-
tional grants, travel, and entertainment gifts.'3 3 Durand argued
these marketing favors violated the Anti-Kickback Law. 34 Second,
the Complaint alleged criminal violations against AstraZeneca in
127. See United States v. Brown, 108 F.3d 863 (8th Cir. 1997); see also Jan Crawford
Greenburg, Health Penalties in Caremark Fraud Case, CHI. TRiB.,June 17, 1995, at NEWS, p. 3.
128. See Weinberg, supra note 13, at 90.
129. See Press Release, DOJ, Oct. 3, 2001 , supra note 106.




134. 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(b) (2000).
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connection with its pricing of Zoladex and other drugs.'5 Specifi-
cally, the Complaint alleged that AstraZeneca significantly inflated
the Average Wholesale Prices (AWP) upon which Medicare reim-
bursements are based. 36 The Complaint further alleged that
AstraZeneca reported an AWP that bore no relation to the actual
cost of the drug Zoladex.17 Instead, AstraZeneca ran a program
called "Return-to-Practice" inviting physicians to purchase Zoladex
at a discounted rate, knowing that because the AWP was inflated,
the reimbursement rate that the Government would pay for the
drug was much higher than the actual cost to physicians.138 Astra-
Zeneca allegedly marketed the spread between the reported AWP
and the discounted purchase price physicians actually paid for its
drug. The third allegation against AstraZeneca was that the com-
pany gave free samples of Zoladex to physicians, knowing that the
physicians would bill Medicare and Medicaid, as well as other fed-
erally-funded insurance programs and private insurers, for
reimbursement for the cost of these free drugs.
39
In December 2003, AstraZeneca settled its case despite the fact
that many of the allegations Durand alleged were identical to those
raised in the TAP litigation.140 Durand's presence as the relator and
the similarity of charges raises a question as to the underlying value
of his claims. AstraZeneca pled guilty to conspiring to violate the
Prescription Drug Manufacturing Act and agreed to pay a total of
$355 million to settle the criminal, FCA, and state Medicaid
charges against it.14 ' AstraZeneca paid $63.9 million in criminal
fines; $266.2 million to settle the FCA liability claims; and $24.9
135. Press Release, DOJ,June 20, 2003, supra note 125.
136. It is important to note that neither Medicare statutes nor regulations historically
have defined the AWP. FABRIKANT ET AL., supra note 38, § 10.02[2], at 10-9. Instead, Medi-
care contractors performed and reported their own AWP calculations, based on
pharmaceutical pricing publications and databases. SeeJoan H. Krause, Regulating, Guiding,
and Enforcing Health Care Fraud, 60 N.Y.U. ANN. SURv. Am. L. 241, 266 (2004-05). In 1997,
the Balanced Budget Amendment began to prescribe a percentage of the AWP for which the
government would reimburse drug manufacturers. Under the Medicare Prescription Drug
Improvement and Modernization Act of 2003, in 2006, prescription drug benefits will be
added to Medicare which will pay seventy-five percent of drug costs between a patient's de-
ductible and $2,250; beneficiaries will pay for drug costs between $2,250 and $5,100; and
Medicare will pay ninety-five percent of drug costs above $5,100. Rick Mayes, Medicare and
America s Healthcare System in Transition: From the Death of Managed Care to the Medicare Moderni-
zation Act of 2003 and Beyond, 38J. HEALTH L. 391, 417-19 (2005). Until 2006, Medicare will
base its reimbursement for outpatient drugs on the AWP Id.
137. SeePress Release, DOJ,June 20, 2003, supra note 125.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Id.; see also, AstraZeneca Pays $355 Million to Settle False Claims Case, supra note 125.
141. Press Release, DOJ,June 20, 2003, supra note 125.
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million to settle the state law claims.14 2 AstraZeneca also entered
into a corporate integrity agreement designed to monitor the way
it reports AWP for prescription drug reimbursements in the fu-
ture.4 3 Finally, in addition to the plea agreement, criminal fines,
and civil fines, AstraZeneca paid $47.5 million to Mr. Durand.'"
The fact that Douglas Durand was the plaintiff whistleblower in
both the TAP case and the case against AstraZeneca should not be
overlooked. The similarity between the charges brought in both
instances should not be viewed as coincidence. Mr. Durand was
employed at TAP for approximately seven months as a Vice Presi-
dent of Sales. 4 5 After quitting his job in 1996, Durand worked for
approximately eight years on the AstraZeneca and TAP litigation
and earned in excess of $125 million for his work as a whistle-
blower.'4 Undoubtedly, his presence in the FCA cases made it
possible for the Government to obtain inside information about
the pricing and marketing practices of pharmaceutical companies
that they would not have otherwise had without a management-
level source of information. Nevertheless, the fact that the Gov-
ernment had been involved in investigating pharmaceutical
pricing on an industry-wide basis before Durand filed his suits and
the fact that Durand was employed at TAP for less than a year be-
fore filing his suits suggest that some questions might be raised
about the proportionality relationship between the contribution
Durand made to prosecution and the amount of his compensation
as a qui tam relator. Douglas Durand is not the only repeat player
among recent qui tam relators.
Most notable among repeat qui tam relators is an enterprise
called Ven-A-Care. A company based in the Florida Keys, Ven-A-
Care has been the lead plaintiff in at least three recent FCA qui tam
cases. 147 Ven-A-Care now operates as a professional qui tam relator
142. See id.
143. Id.; see FABRIKANT ET AL., supra note 38, § 10.02[1], at 10-4 (discussing how the
Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement and Modernization Act of 2003 (MMA), Pub. L.
No. 108-173, 117 Stat. 2065 (Dec. 8, 2003), changed the Average Wholesale Price
methodology); see also FABRIKANT ET AL., supra note 38, § 10.02[2], at 10-8 to 10-9 (discuss-
ing the old reimbursement for Medicare Part B drugs and biologicals based upon AWP, and
quoting the CMS proposal for replacing the old AWP calculation).
144. See Press Release, DOJ,June 20, 2003, supra note 125.
145. Weinberg, supra note 13, at 90.
146. Id.
147. Ven-A-Care's first claim was a suit against a Germany-based medical care company,
Fresenius Medical Care (Fresenius). Fresenius agreed to pay the U.S. Government $486
million to settle a lawsuit in which Ven-A-Care alleged Fresenius defrauded the Medicare
and Medicaid programs. Ven-A-Care received $40 million as its share of the Government's
recovery. Second, Ven-A-Care filed the original qui tam suit against Bayer Corporation, which
resulted in a $14 million settlement by the defendant pharmaceutical company in order to
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with several cases pending, now under seal."" Ven-A-Care is unique
in that the cases it pursues did not involve first-hand experience
with an allegedly fraudulent Medicare pharmaceutical vendor, but
rather are based on their own private investigation work leading to
a qui tam action.' 49 Prior to 1994, when Ven-A-Care filed its first qui
tam lawsuits against Fresenius, the organization was a small phar-
maceutical company located in a strip mall in Key West, Florida.
1 5 0
Annual revenues barely amounted to $1 million in sales per year
and increased competition, along with declining reimbursements,
threatened its future. 15 ' According to the Ven-A-Care principals,
they got into the qui tam relator business on a "hunch" that one of
its competitors was falsifying patient records. 15 2 After hiring an FBI
agent, Ven-A-Care filed and settled a False Claims Act claim for
$486 million.5 3 The principals of Ven-A-Care, Louis Cobo and
Mark Jones, no longer sell intravenous drugs for a living; they are
now professional qui tam relators.
5 4
Another qui tam relator of interest is George Couto. Mr. Couto
was involved in developing a program for the Bayer Corporation to
enable it to offer a forty percent discount on its drugs sold to one
of its major clients, Kaiser-Permanente Medical Care. 5  The price
break was under the "private labeling program," which Mr. Couto,
in his capacity as Marketing Manager for Bayer Corporation,
helped to design.5 6 Under the private labeling program, Bayer dis-
counted the sale price of its drug Cipro and other pharmaceuticals
resolve allegations that Bayer defrauded forty-five states' Medicaid programs by falsely over-
stating the average wholesale prices for its drugs. Third, Ven-A-Care filed Texas ex rel. Ven-A-
Care of the florida Keys, Inc. v. Warrick Pharmaceuticals Corp., No. GV002327 (Tex. Dist. Ct. April
20, 2004) (settlement agreement and release) (on file with the University of MichiganJour-
nal of Law Reform). In April 2004, the defendants agreed to settle that case, and Ven-A-Care
netted $5.3 million for its work as relator in that litigation.
148. David Villano, Spy: Fraud; Key West's Ven-A-Care Is Getting Rich Ferreting out Abuse in the
Healthcare Industry, FLA. TREND MAG., May 2002, at 76 ((on file with the University of Michi-





153. Ven-A-Care declined Fresenius' predecessor's offer to participate in a scheme that
Fresenius' predecessor promised would quickly lead to large profits. Ven-A-Care declined
because they were suspicious that any company could make "quick money" given the nature
of their business. This "hunch" led Ven-A-Care to investigate and then prosecute Fresenius
and subsequently began its new business of investigating and filing qui tam claims. Id.
154. Id.
155. See Press Release, DOJ, Nov. 10, 2003, supra note 83.
156. Peter Aronson, A Rouge to Catch a Rouge, NAT'L L.J. (Aug. 18, 2003), available at
http://www.law.com/jsp/nlj/PubArticlePrinterFriendlyNLJ.jsp?id=1059980477198.
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to Kaiser in order to keep that company's business.57 However,
since Medicaid reimbursements'58 were based upon the "best price"
that Bayer offered to its Medicaid purchasers, 59 the private labeling
program allowed Bayer to sell drugs to Kaiser at a discount that was
not reported to the Government for best pricing purposes.'60 Couto
not only negotiated this transaction with Kaiser, but is reported to
have believed that the program was "potentially illegal" at the time
157. Id.
158. Under Medicaid, states have substantial discretion in setting provider reimburse-
ment rates generally. However, Federal regulations limit Medicaid reimbursement rates in
order to control costs. See Etienne E. Pracht & William J. Moore, Interest Groups and State
Medicaid Drug Programs, 28J. HEALTH POL. POL'Y & L. 9, 13 (2003).
159. At the time of the case, the "best price" was defined in the Omnibus Budget Rec-
onciliation Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 1396r-8(c) (1) (C) (2000) as follows:
(i) In general
The term "best price" means, with respect to a single source drug or innovator mul-
tiple source drug of a manufacturer, the lowest price available from the manufacturer
during the rebate period to any wholesaler, retailer, provider, health maintenance or-
ganization, nonprofit entity, or governmental entity within the United States,
excluding-
(I) any prices charged on or after October 1, 1992, to the Indian
Health Service, the Department of Veterans Affairs, a State home re-
ceiving funds under section 1741 of title 38, the Department of
Defense, the Public Health Service, or a covered entity described in
subsection (a) (5) (B) of this section;
(II) any prices charged under the Federal Supply Schedule of the Gei-
eral Services Administration;
(III) any prices used under a State pharmaceutical assistance program;
and
(IV) any depot prices and single award contract prices, as defined by
the Secretary, of any agency of the Federal Government.
(ii) Special rules
The term "best price"-
(I) shall be inclusive of cash discounts, free goods that are contingent
on any purchase requirement, volume discounts, and rebates (other
than rebates under this section);
(II) shall be determined without regard to special packaging, labeling,
or identifiers on the dosage form or product or package; and
(III) shall not take into account prices that are merely nominal in
amount.
Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 1396r-8(c) (1) (C) (2000).
160. When states extend outpatient prescription drug coverage to Medicaid beneficiar-
ies, participating pharmaceutical manufacturers must sign a rebate agreement with the
Government. The rebate agreement indirectly controls drug prices that the government
pays. It requires drug manufacturers to offer the government either 15.1% off the "average
manufacturer price" of a drug sold to a private purchaser, or the "best price" given to a non-
Medicaid purchaser. 42 U.S.C. § 1396r-8 (2000).
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that he negotiated the deal with Kaiser.'G Nevertheless, Couto and
his team,
[f] aced with the potential of losing all of Kaiser's [Cipro] busi-
ness ... due to deep, deep discounting and our need to
balance Kaiser's sales with impact on [Government] best pric-
ing scenarios [sic], [we have] constructed various contracting
scenarios ... [and have] responded professionally, efficiently,
and most of all, very quickly."
62
After Couto completed the Kaiser deal in late 1999, in February
2000, he filed an FCA action against Bayer."13 In it, he alleged that
the private labeling program resulted in Bayer's filing numerous
false claims for payment from the Government, and violated the
False Claims Act." In April 2000, the U.S. Attorney's Office in Bos-
ton announced a $257 million settlement and plea agreement with
Bayer."5 George Couto's share of that settlement was twenty-four
percent, or $34 million.'"" George Couto died at the age of thirty-
nine, five months before the case settled; his children are the pri-
mary beneficiaries of his work as a qui tam relator."
67
Privatizing FCA prosecution invites qui tam players like Durand,
Ven-A-Care, and Couto. These relators used their information of
wrongdoing to file suit rather than to effect change within the or-
ganizations or laws at issue. Moreover, by their claims, little has
been done to improve or clarify the legal regime under which fu-
ture manufacturers must operate. When the Government is a
prosecutor independent of qui tam relator influence, its self-
interest is clearly subordinated to its duty to serve the public good.
However, when the Government is influenced by self-interested qui
tam relators the result of their influence may deleteriously affect
the law.




165. Boston U.S. Attorney's Office Announces Agreement with Bayer, GlaxoSmithddline to Settle
Medicaid Overcharges, KAISER DAILY HEALTH POL'Y REP. Apr. 17, 2003, available at http://
www.kaisernetwork.org/daily-reports/rep-ind ex.cfin?DRID=17232; Bayer Agrees to Biggest
Medicaid Fraud Settlement, USA TODAY, Apr. 16, 2003, available at http://www.usatoday.com/
money/industries/health/drugs/2003-04-16-drug-settlement.x.htm; see also HEALTH CARE
FRAUD ANNUAL REPORT 2003, supra note 85, at 2.
166. Bayer Agrees to Biggest Medicaid Fraud Settlement, supra note 165.
167. Id.
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C. The Substantive Limitations ofQui Tam-Made Law
Highly motivated qui tam plaintiffs develop and press theories of
recovery that often require aggressive interpretations of existing
law. In many instances, as with the TAP Pharmaceutical case, these
matters are settled without any judicial or legislative opportunity to
change the law in an orderly fashion that provides guidance for
future transactions. In other instances, courts have sufficient
precedent to realize that the relator's theory of recovery would be
an imprudent advancement in the law. In still other cases, relators
present issues of first impression for the courts that regulators have
been addressing for years. Whether qui tam relators raise wholly
novel issues or issues that are new to courts but not regulators,
courts have found themselves making brand new law in response toS 168
qui tam claims. A recently settled qui tam case that centered on a
well-established practiced called "off-label marketing" illustrates
the shortcomings of such qui tam made law.
On May 13, 2004, the Department ofJustice (DOJ) entered into
a Settlement Agreement and Release with Warner-Lambert Com-
pany, Inc. (Warner-Lambert); its parent company, Pfizer, Inc.
(Pfizer), a pharmaceutical manufacturer; Parke-Davis, a subdivision
of Warner-Lambert; and Dr. David Franklin, the qui tam relator
who initially filed the action alleging pharmaceutical fraud. 69 Un-
der this settlement, the defendants agreed to plead guilty to
criminal charges alleging violation of the Food, Drug and Cosmetic
Act (FDCA) and to pay $430 million to resolve criminal and civil
charges against it. 7 0 In addition to the criminal fines of $240
million, Warner-Lambert paid to settle the FCA claims, Warner-
Lambert also agreed to pay $83.6 million to the federal
Government, and another $38 million to settle the alleged state law
168. See Joan H. Krause, "Promises to Keep": Health Care Providers and the Civil False Claims
Act, 23 CARDOZO L. REV. 1363, 1368 (2002) ("When health care FCA suits are settled rather
than tried, these innovative theories are not subject to review by a court-raising the very
real possibility that federal prosecutors are themselves 'legislating' an expansion of the
law.").
169. See United States ex rel. Franklin v. Parke-Davis, 147 F. Supp. 2d 39 (D. Mass. 2001);
Press Release, U.S. Dep't ofJustice, Warner-Lambert to Pay $430 Million to Resolve Criminal
& Civil Health Care Ability Relating to Off-Label Promotion (May 13, 2004), http://
www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/2004/May/04_civ-322.htm (on file with the University of Michigan
Journal of Law Reform) [hereinafter Press Release, DOJ, May 13, 2004].
170. Letter from Michael J. Sullivan, United States Attorney for the District of Massa-
chusetts, to Robert B. Fiske, Jr., and James P. Rouhandeh, Attorneys, Davis Polk & Wardwell
(May 13, 2004) (on file with the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform). The recent
Parke-Davis settlement brings the total amount collected from pharmaceutical companies to
settle civil claims in the last three years to $1.6 billion.
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consumer claims.' 71 Under the agreement, Warner-Lambert will pay
$24.6 million to the relator, Dr. David Franklin.'
72
. The Warner-Lambert Company manufactures and sells pharma-
ceutical products through its division and co-defendant Parke-
Davis.1 73 Both entities were acquired by Pfizer.7 4 The Food and
Drug Administration (FDA) approved the Parke-Davis drug, Neu-
rontin, as a second-line drug to treat epilepsy.1 75 However, Parke-
Davis, through its parent, Warner-Lambert, aggressively marketed
Neurontin as a treatment for other purposes. Neurontin was
marketed as a treatment for pain, attention deficit disorder, mi-
graine headaches, drug and alcoholic withdrawal seizures, restless
leg syndrome, Amyotrophic Lateral Sclerosis, and as a first-line
mono-therapy treatment for epilepsy. 76 Because these were not
FDA approved uses, they are called "off-label" uses for the drug
Neurontin. Physicians in most states are permitted to prescribe
off-label uses for FDA-approved drugs, provided the FDA has ap-
proved of the use and the physicians believe, in their best medical
judgment, that the drug would serve the best interest of their
patient.17  Nevertheless, in an Information filed in the United
States District Court for the District of Massachusetts on May 13,
2004, the U.S. Attorney alleged violations of various sections of the
Food Drug and Cosmetic Act. 178
The allegations included charges that the companies marketed
Neurontin for uses unapproved by the FDA, misbranded Neu-
rontin for uses unapproved by the FDA, and deliberately decided
not to seek FDA approval for the unapproved uses it encouraged in
order to increase its Neurontin sales. 79 The core of the
171. Press Release, DOJ, May 13, 2004, supra note 169.
172. Id. Franklin filed his qui tam action on August 20, 1996. During the period from
1996 through 1999, the Government considered intervening. In 1999, the Government
declined to intervene and instead filed an amicus brief and preserved its option to intervene
at a later date, and the case seal was lifted. The settlement on May 13, 2004 completed an
eight-year period of investigation and litigation against Parke-Davis. Parke-Davis, 147 F.
Supp. 2d at 46; see also Bernadette Tansey, Huge Penalty in Drug Fraud Pfizer Settles Felony Case
in Neurontin Off-Label Promotion, S.F. CHRONICLe, May 14, 2004, at C-i;
173. Parke-Davis, 147 F. Supp. 2d at 44; see also Aronson, supra note 156. Also, for all of
the facts alleged, see the original complaint. Complaint, United States ex rel. Franklin v.
Parke-Davis, 147 F. Supp. 2d 39 (D. Mass. 2001) (No. 96-11651PBS), 1996 WL 33578368.
174. Parke-Davis, 147 F. Supp. 2d at 44 n.2.
175. Id. at 45.
176. Press Release, DOJ, May 13, 2004, supra note 169; see also Parke-Davis, 147 F. Supp.
2d at 45.
177. Parke-Davis, 147 F Supp. 2d at 44.
178. Complaint, United States ex rel. Franklin v. Parke-Davis, 147 F. Supp. 2d 39 (D.
Mass. 2001) (No. 96-11651PBS), 1996 WL 33578368.
179. Id.
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Government's allegations against Warner-Lambert consisted of the
charge that the company fraudulently promoted off-label sales of
Neurontin for use as a pain medication and for other unapproved
applications, using well-prepared sales representatives, "medical
liaisons" who falsely posed as objective medical representatives to
promote off-label use of Neurontin, conference presentations, and
teleconferences including fraudulent clinical updates of the drug's
efficacy as a non-epilepsy use drug.8 ° Further allegations included
anti-kickback charges against Warner-Lambert.' 8 ' The qui tam rela-
tor alleged that the defendants paid kickbacks to physicians in the
form of preceptor fees, consultant fees, and travel gifts, in ex-
change for prescribing large quantities of Parke-Davis drugs in
violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1320(a-7) (b). 82 The Complaint further al-
leged that Parke-Davis promoted scientifically invalid drug studies
to encourage the use of Neurontin.'8 3 Lastly, Franklin's Complaint
contained mislabeling allegations.' 84 The relator alleged that Neu-
rontin was distributed with labels and instructions that were
inadequate as directions for the use for which the drug was intro-
duced into interstate commerce in violation of the FDCA.' 85
These allegations came to light on August 20, 1996 when Dr.
David Franklin filed a qui tam action against Warner-Lambert, un-
der seal, in the United States District Court for the District of
Massachusetts. Dr. Franklin, a Ph.D. who had been employed by
Warner-Lambert as a medical liaison for five months, filed the
charges that later appeared in the Government's Information
against Warner-Lambert.'8 "
Most of Dr. Franklin's allegations were dismissed early in the
case.8 7 For example, the court held that a violation of the Federal
Anti-Kickback statute was not a per se violation of the False Claims
Act. Rather, the court said that in order for a kickback violation
to become actionable under the FCA, the Government must have
conditioned payment of the claim upon a certification, whether
implied or expressed, that the claimant was in compliance with the
180. Id.
181. Id.




186. United States ex rel. Franklin v. Parke-Davis, 147 F. Supp. 2d 39, 44, 46 (D. Mass.
2001).
187. For example, the court dismissed Dr. Franklin's claims relating to the Veterans'
Administration, holding these were not pled with sufficient specificity under FED. R. Civ. P.
9(b) to survive a motion to dismiss. See id. at 43-50, 55 (denying in part and granting in part
defendant's Rule 9 and 12(b)(6) motions).
188. Id. at 54.
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anti-kickback provision itself.' No such certification was filed by
the defendant in this case.' 90 Therefore, the Court held that the
relator's claim could not rest on any false certification theory.'9 '
Significantly, the court declined to adopt Dr. Franklin's novel no-
tion that the theory of false certification could cover claims filed
not by the defendant itself, but by third parties. Declining this ex-
tension of the false claims theory promoted by the relator, the
court dismissed the anti-kickback allegations under the FCA in this
192case.
Also, the court dismissed the relator's claim that the defendants
violated FDA regulations that required clinical trials to be provided
free of charge. 93 The Parke-Davis Court identified its view of the
proper limits to Medicare fraud prosecution under the FCA, saying
that the plaintiffs clinical trials count was an example "of the Rela-
tor improperly seeking to use the FCA as a means to enforce
various regulatory proscriptions of the FDA."' 4 The court declined
to allow the relator to use the FCA to prosecute various alleged
regulatory violations as fraud, and cited the Pogue case' 95 with ap-
proval for its proposition that the FCA was not "intended to
operate as a stalking horse for the enforcement of every statute,
rule or regulation."
96
However, Dr. Franklin's off-label marketing claims did survive
early dismissal. These were allegations that the Parke-Davis market-
ing scheme caused submission of numerous off-label prescriptions
for Nurontin to the Medicaid program through the use of false
and fraudulent statements about the safety and efficacy of the
drug.'9 Remarkably, Parke-Davis' defense rested essentially on the
argument that it had not submitted the false claim for reimburse-
ment for Nurontin. Rather, Parke-Davis actually conceded that
189. Id. at 54-55; United States ex rel. Augustine v. Century Health Servs., Inc., 289 F.3d
409, 415 (6th Cir. 2002); Gublo v. Novacare, Inc., 62 F. Supp. 2d 347, 355 (D. Mass. 1999);
United States ex rel. Pogue v. American Healthcorp, Inc., 914 F. Supp. 1507, 1513 (M.D.
Tenn. 1996).
190. Parke-Davis, 147 E Supp. 2d at 55. But see United States ex rel. Franklin v. Parke-
Davis, No. Civ.A. 96-11651PBS, 2003 WL 22048255, at *7 (D. Mass. Aug. 22, 2003) (finding
arguments regarding implied certification persuasive though the court declined to reverse
the claim).




195. United States ex rel. Poque v. American Healthcorp, Inc., 914 F. Supp. 1057, 1513
(M.D. Tenn. 1996).
196. Parke-Davis, 147 F. Supp. 2d at 55.
197. Id. at 51-53, 55.
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submitting claims for reimbursement for off-label prescriptions was
a violation of the False Claims Act; the defendants simply alleged
that the providers, not the manufacturers, would be liable under
such a theory of recovery. '98 The core of the court's decision to
permit the off-label use charges to proceed rested on the relator's
allegation that defendants used false and fraudulent statements to
induce the providers to submit false and fraudulent claims for re-
imbursement for Neurontin. The Court conceded that "[a] much
closer question would be presented if the allegations [against War-
ner-Lambert] involved only the unlawful-yet truthful-promotion
of off-label uses to physicians . .. ."'99 Thus, the cumbersome ma-
chinery of an FCA action was mobilized to address whether or not
Warner-Lambert's advertising was truthful. Despite the defendant's
admission of liability, it is important to note that this court did not
conclude that off-label marketing was directly actionable under the
FCA. In fact, the court observed that the FDA permits physicians to
prescribe drugs for off-label usage. 00 On the other hand, the FDA
does prohibit drug manufacturers from marketing and promoting
drugs for off-label uses, 1 and the FDA prohibits the distribution of
drugs where the labeling includes information about off-label
uses.20 2 In fact, the Parke-Davis Court found the terms of the FCA
provided limited ability to address the complex policy issues and
wide variety of state practices regarding off-label marketing.
The court limited off-label claims to ones that satisfied a "dou-
ble-falsehood" requirement.204 These would apply only to the
relator's claims resting on 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a) (2)-the false state-
ments provision of the FCA. The court held that under this
provision, both the statements by the defendants used to induce
the filing of claims for reimbursement, and the claims for reim-
bursement themselves, had to be false in order to be actionable
under the FCA. 20 5 However, the court did not completely foreclose
198. Id. at 51-53. Defendants allege that the physicians' submission of false claims were
an intervening cause, breaking the chain of liability to the manufacturer for promoting off-
label tise. The Court rejected this claim, holding that physicians' prescriptions were foresee-
able, and therefore, not an intervening force to break the causal connection between the
pharmaceutical companies' conduct and liability. Id. at 52-53.
199. Id. at52.
200. Id. at 44 (citing Buckman Co. v. Plaintiffs Legal Comm., 531 U.S. 341, 350 (2001)
(finding that the FDA seeks to regulate pharmaceuticals without interfering with the prac-
tice of medicine)).
201. 21 U.S.C. § 331(d) (2000).
202. Id.
203. Parke-Davis, 147 F. Supp. 2d at 52.; see also United States ex rel. Franklin v. Parke-
Davis, No. Civ.A. 96-11651PBS, 2003 WL 22048255, at *2 (D. Mass. Aug. 22, 2003).
204. Parke-Davis, 147 F Supp. 2d at 52, 55.
205. Id. at 51-52.
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FCA actions alleging that only the claim for reimbursement was
false under the false claims provision of the FCA, 31 U.S.C.
§ 3729 (a) (1). This "much closer question" remains a possible, col-
orable cause of action.206 The debate then turned to the question of
whether a claim for reimbursement for an off-label use was indeed
false in each of the relevant states. The court concluded that where
a state's Medicaid program permitted off-label uses of drugs, a
claim for such reimbursement would not be false within the mean-
ing of the FCA.217 The Court concluded, and in fact Parke-Davis
conceded, that eight states did not provide reimbursement for off-
label drug prescriptions and, therefore, in those states off-label
claims for reimbursement were by definition false within the mean-
ing of the FCA.2°8
The Parke-Davis case is significant for the unique approaches the
qui tam relator took to existing law. First, the qui tam asserted that
pharmaceutical companies may be held liable under a false
certification theory for false claims that they themselves did not
submit, but rather for the claims of physicians that were submitted
as a result of the marketing and promotion of off-label uses for
non-FDA approved drugs.209 This third-party approach to false cer-
tification under the FCA is unique to pharmaceutical fraud cases.
Secondly, the pharmaceutical manufacturers' statements used to
induce or "cause" filing of false claims under the false statements
provision of the FCA must be actually false in order to support FCA
liability. However, claims defined as "false" are fully reimbursed by
several states, and recognized by the federal courts as important to
the regular practice of medicine.210
Although Warner-Lambert agreed to plead guilty to the counts
which rested on its practice of promoting off-label usage of its
products,21' it is unlikely that this qui tam settlement in any way
clarifies or has advances the regulatory law that controls the com-
plex issue of off-label marketing. In some ways, the qui tam
approach to this issue ignores existing common and statutory law
on point entirely. First, it should be noted that the U.S. Supreme
Court has held that off-label marketing is "necessary" to the FDA's
206. Id.
207. Parke-Davis, 2003 WL 22048255, at *2.
208. Id. at *3
209. Parke-Davis, 147 F. Supp. 2d at 53-54.
210. Parke-Davis, 2003 WL 22048255, at *3.
211. Warner-Lambert agreed to plead guilty to two criminal counts alleging violations of
21 U.S.C. §§ 331(a), 331(d), 333(a), 352(f)(1) & 355. These counts alleged crimes of dis-
tributing unapproved new drugs and misbranding drugs with labels for inadequate
directions for use, in violation of the FDCA. Letter from MichaelJ. Sullivan, supra note 170.
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mission. Second, the Supreme Court has specifically recognized
that primary jurisdiction over this issue properly rests with the ad-
ministrative authority of the FDA . Third, the Supreme Court has
cited both the statutory complexity and the importance of
competing interests it balances as two compelling reasons that
should-but likely will not-dissuade qui-tam litigants from at-
tempting to alter off-label marketing rules via the FCA. Rejecting
the plaintiff's fraud claims based on off-label marketing of a medi-
cal device, the Court in Buckman Co. v. Plaintiffs' Legal Committee
explained,
[F]lexibility is a critical component of the statutory and regu-
latory framework under which the FDA pursues difficult (and
often competing) objectives. For example, ... "off-label" us-
age of medical devices (use of a device for some other
purpose than that for which it has been approved by the FDA)
is an accepted and necessary corollary of the FDA's mission to regulate
in this area without directly interfering with the practice of medi-
cine. ... Thus, the FDA is charged with the difficult task of
regulating the marketing and distribution of medical devices without
intruding upon decisions statutorily committed to the discretion of
health care professionals.
214
In fact, while manufacturers like Warner-Lambert may not law-
fully promote off-label uses themselves, physicians may do so."'
Moreover, several states require insurance companies to cover pre-
scriptions for off-label usage of drugs.2 1 6 Yet, the FDA has
212. See Buckman Co. v. Plaintiffs Legal Comm., 531 U.S. 341, 350 (2001) (holding
plaintiffs' tort claims for injury from FDA approved orthopedic bone screws were pre-
empted by the Food Drug and Cosmetic Act and the Medical Device Amendments (MDA)
thereto).
213. Buckman, 531 U.S. at 348 ("The conflict stems from the fact that the federal statu-
tory scheme amply empowers the FDA to punish and deter fraud against the Administration,
and that this authority is used by the Administration to achieve a somewhat delicate balance
of statutory objectives. The balance sought by the Administration can be skewed by allowing
fraud-on-the-FDA claims under state tort law."); id. at 349 n.4 ("The FDCA leaves no doubt
that it is the Federal Government rather than private litigants who are authorized to file suit
for noncompliance with the medical device provisions.").
214. Id. at 349-50 (emphasis added).
215. See Allergan, Inc. v. Alcon Laboratories, Inc., 324 F.3d 1322, 1324 n.1 (Fed. Cir.
2003).
216. For example, thirty-four states including Kansas, Maine, and Massachusetts require
coverage of off-label prescriptions. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 40-2-167 (West 1999); ME. REV. STAT.
ANN. tit. 24-1, § 4324-D (1997); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 176G, § 4G (West 1998). New
Mexico and Washington have non-legislative agreements with insurance providers to cover
off-label usage. And Hawaii regulators have promulgated an administrative rule with the
force of law which requires insurance coverage of off-label usage. See Drusilla S. Raiford,
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repeatedly revised its regulations concerning the practice by manu-
facturers, because it has long acknowledged the important role
217played by off-label or unapproved usages in medical practice.
Courts have deferred direct common-law regulation of off-label
marketing, based on their appreciation of the danger presented by
interfering with the delivery of health care and relationships be-
tween manufacturers, physicians and their patients.2 's There are
even issues of Constitutional dimension raised by off-label market-
ing.1
None of these larger concerns is directly addressed by Dr.
Franklin's litigation against Warner-Lambert. Nothing in the War-
ner-Lambert record suggests that Dr. Franklin's qui tam action
addressed: any of the existing regulations on point; the FDA's years
of effort to balance competing public health concerns at issue; the
federalism, primary jurisdiction and preemption issues courts face
when addressing the matter; or even the first amendment rights
raised by this long-standing practice. By definition and design, the
FCA action compels a narrow focus on the issue of fraud and, con-
sequently, relator-made law fails to address important substantive
and policy issues. Off-label promotion practices are one example of
the shortcomings of relator-made law.
D. The Expensive Proliferation of Weak Claims
Three additional recent pharmaceutical cases filed under the
FCA underscore one final detriment presented by the proliferation
of relator-directed lawsuits. Qui tam relators have begun to allege a
wide variety of regulatory violations and oversight as the basis for
an FCA claim. 20 This approach to the law has the potential to
Sheila R. Shulman, & Louis Lasagna, Determining Appropriate Reimbursement for Prescription
Drugs: Off Label Uses and Investigational Therapies, 49 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 37, 39 (1994).
217. See Citizen Petition Regarding the Food and Drug Administration's Policy on Pro-
motion of Unapproved Uses of Approved Drugs and Devices; Request for Comments, 59
Fed. Reg. 59,820-01 (Nov. 18, 1994); Draft Policy Statement on Industry-Supported Scientific
and Educational Activities, 57 Fed. Reg. 56,412 (Nov. 27, 1992). But cf. Regulations on
Statements Made for Dietary Supplements Concerning the Effect of the Product on the
Structure or Function of the Body, 65 Fed. Reg. 1,000-01 (Jan. 6, 2000).
218. See, e.g., Sigma-Tau Pharm., Inc. v. Schwetz, 288 E3d 141, 147-48 (4th Cir. 2002).
219. SeeWash. Legal Found. v. Kessler, 880 F Supp. 26, 28 n. I (D.D.C. 1995).
220. See, e.g., United States v. Whiteside, 285 F.3d 1345, 1351 (11th Cir. 2002); United
States ex rel. Hunt v. Merck-Medco Managed Care, L.L.C., 336 F. Supp. 2d 430, 436 (E.D. Pa.
2004); In re Genesis Health Ventures, Inc. v. Debtors, 272 B.R. 558, 563 (D. Del. 2002); see
also United States e re. Perales v. St. Margaret's Hosp., 243 F. Stpp. 2d 843, 852 (C.D. Il1.
2003) (dismissing allegations that the purchase of medical practices at prices in excess of
fair market value violated Stark and Antikickback laws and were actionable under the FCA).
WINTER 2007]
University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform
create poorly reasoned precedent and to expend considerable ju-
dicial resources in the process. So far, courts appear to be
discerning the difference between federal level fraud, and the
regulation questions qui tam relators are raising. Nevertheless, this
method of sifting the "wheat from the chaff' is expensive and does
not guarantee that a uniform or consistent body of law will result.
In the first case, Medco Health Solutions, one of the world's
largest pharmaceutical benefits management company (PBM) ,21
was sued in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania by three qui tam
relators: Hunt, Gauger, and Piancentile. In this case, the Govern-
ment intervened,2  and the U.S. Attorney, as well as twenty state
attorneys general,joined the case, alleging that Medco encouraged
providers to prescribe its drugs by switching patients to prescrip-
tions it claimed would save both patients and their prescribers
223money. Instead, the switches to Medco products actually in-
creased costs to health plans and to patients. 2 2 These marketing
techniques were not per se illegal. Rather, in the case of United States
of America v. Merck-Medco Managed Care, L.L.C., et al., the United
States and state attorneys general alleged that the switching pro-
gram Medco sponsored caused providers and patients to incur
increased costs, despite the representations made by Medco that
these switches would save costs. 2 25 Thus, the falsity in this case, for
FCA purposes, was provided by the defendants' misrepresenta-
tions, not by the underlying switching conduct itself. Whether a
charge of federal fraud is the proper tool to address false advertis-
ing is open to question. In an industry as large as pharmaceuticals,
creating legal precedent based on a few large, potentially aberra-
tional cases may not only overstate the law, but may unnecessarily
221. Merck-Medco Managed Care, L.L.C., 336 F. Supp. 2d at 436. A PBM contracts as an
intermediary between health plans (purchasing prescription drugs) and pharmacies that
provide those drugs to the patients enrolled in health plans. The list of drugs distributed by
a PBM is called a formulary. Since they first appeared approximately thirty years ago, PBMs
have sponsored sales promotion, rebate, and network programs to induce sales of their
respective formulary products.
222. See Merck-Medco Managed Car, L.LC., 336 F. Supp. 2d at 434. Under the FCA, a per-
son may initiate an action on behalf of himself and the United States Government under 31
U.S.C. § 3730(b)(1) (1994). Upon filing, the plaintiff must also serve a copy of the com-
plaint and a sealed disclosure to the government. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b) (2) (1994). Thereafter,
under 31 U.S.C. 3730(b) (4) (1994), the Government has sixty days, which may be extended,
during which it must notify the court whether it will intervene and proceed with the litiga-
tion, or that it declines to intervene. However, 31 U.S.C. 3730(c) (3) (1994) preserves the
Government's right to intervene in that action at any time.
223. See Merck-Medco Managed Care, L.L.C., 336 E Supp. 2d at 447. The drug switching
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interfere with the development of a healthy and cost effective mar-
ket.
2 26
In a second case, the Civil False Claims Act provided the basis
for a Bankruptcy Court finding in the matter of Genesis Health
Ventures, et al. v. Debtors.2 7 West End Pharmacy, Inc. (West End) a
pharmaceutical provider, supplied services to Cherry Hill
Convalescent Center (CHCC). Vitalink Pharmacy Services, Inc., a
multi-state pharmaceutical provider, acquired West End and was
later acquired by NeighborCare, whose parent is Genesis. Genesis
is a Chapter 11 debtor. In a separate action, CHCC filed an FCA
case against Genesis. The basis of this qui tam relator's claim was
that Genesis violated the FCA when it failed to credit the Govern-
ment for the return and resale of unused drugs supplied to the
CHCC nursing home. When Genesis went into Chapter 11 bank-
ruptcy, CHCC filed a proof of claim, seeking to value its FCA action
against Genesis at $324 million. According to CHCC, its allegations
under the FCA claim proved that Genesis had damaged the Gov-
ernment by overcharging for Medicaid drugs supplied to CHCC by
West End.2
The FCA claim at issue in Genesis was filed by qui tam relator R.
Steven Scherfel. The Genesis Court declined to ascribe any value
whatsoever to this FCA claim. It held that claims for payment are
not false in the absence of clear federal statutory or regulatory re-
quirements that West End credit the Government for unused
pharmaceuticals.2 2 Noting significant differences in the various
states' approaches to reimbursement for unused drugs, the Court
said this variety of approaches negates any "opportunity to con-
clude" that a failure to provide credits constitutes a false or
fraudulent claim under the FCA.23 ° The debtor, West End, did not
act knowingly to file false claims, where there was no specificity
about crediting returns under statutes, regulations or contracts.2
31
Finally, the Court concluded that crediting returned drugs is not a
condition of payment and, therefore, no false certification cause of
226. See Higgins & Golze, supra note 92, at 1485.
227. In re Genesis Health Ventures, Inc. v. Debtors, 272 B.R. 558, 571 (D. Del. 2002)
(granting motions to value claimant's proof of claim based on qui tam action at zero).
228. West End provided pharmacy supplies to CHCC, stocking its drug carts for patient
use. CHCC returned unused drugs to West End, which West End allegedly resold to other
purchasers. However, CHCC alleged that West End billed Medicaid for returned drugs,
without crediting the Government, for the fact that these pharmaceuticals were resold to
other purchasers. Id. at 562-63.
229. Id. at 569.
230. Id.
231. Id. at 570
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action existed against West End. 32 The Genesis Court's analysis is of
particular importance, because it is a bankruptcy court; bankruptcy
courts have special expertise in determining when a set of inchoate
rights has value. An essential element of the FCA cause of action
against West End was that it made a claim for payment against the
Government's public fisc. Finding no claim, and further no falsity,
the Genesis Court's reasoning is instructive for future analysis of
what might constitute a claim for payment under the FCA. This
case illustrates that in the absence of any clear federal statute or
regulation requiring a condition precedent to payment, the failure
to satisfy that condition cannot result in transforming a claim for
payment into an actionable claim under the FCA.
On similar grounds, the Eleventh Circuit in United States v. White-
side233 reversed a conviction under the Criminal False Claims Act,
based upon the Government's failure to prove that its regulatory
scheme could not be reasonably interpreted as the defendant ar-
gued.234 In that case, the defendant was indicted on conspiracy and
false statement charges arising out of cost reports that classified
debt as being capital-related. 23 5 The relator's claims in this case
challenged a debatable characterization of interest expense on the
defendant's cost reports. 23" The court in Whiteside ruled that be-
cause the Government did not discharge its burden to prove
beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant's statement was not
true under a "reasonable interpretation" of the law, the convic-
tion below had to be reversed. Courts appear appropriately
unwilling to classify as fraud misinterpretations of vague, ambigu-
ous, or contradictory regulatory schemes.
Without question, the Government's resources are stretched,
and its ability to investigate and prosecute fraud effectively is com-
promised by its limited budget and personnel. 23 " However,
accommodating questionable qui tam plaintiffs, who advance novel
but untested theories of recovery concerning small and contestable
regulatory points related to pricing, accounting, and the delivery
of care, replaces thoughtful, flexible, and appropriate regulatory
authority with a privately-driven system of penalizing a range of
non-fraudulent conduct, as though it were true fraud. Neither the
232. Id.
233. United States v. Whiteside, 285 E3d 1345, 1351 (11th Cir. 2002).
234. Id. at 1352.
235. Id. at 1350.
236. Id. at 1351.
237. Id. at 1352.
238. Pamela H. Bucy, Civil Prosecution of Health Care Fraud, 30 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 693,
756-57 (1995).
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plain language of the statute nor the evidence we have of Con-
gress' intent suggest that this is an advantageous arrangement.
The data along with summaries of the preceding pharmaceutical
fraud cases confirm that the Government is allowing qui tam rela-
tors to influence its exercise of prosecutorial discretion. The qui
tam-directed litigation hinders the development of good law, and
costs companies, individuals, and taxpayers hundreds of millions of
dollars.39 In the case of the pharmaceutical industry, this approach
to FCA enforcement leaves an already unregulated and disorderly
industry in even further disarray. However, to appreciate fully the
source of the Government's misdirection requires a closer look at
the qui tam partnership between the private and the public en-
forcer.
The role of the relator in FCA litigation far exceeds the role of
private attorney generals in other public-private forms of enforce-
ment. For example, the citizen suit provisions of environmental
statutes require all recoveries to be returned to the United States
Treasury.24° In marked contrast to the FCA, this allocation of funds
significantly reduces the influence that private financial gain might
have on private enforcement of these statutes. In many cases, a
condition of settling environmental citizen suits requires defen-
dants to donate funds to environmental advocacy groups.241 Even
this distribution of post-settlement funds does not represent the
same level of financial self-interest with which qui tam relators must
contend. In antitrust litigation, private enforcement is constrained
by the standing requirement that requires the private plaintiff to
have suffered an antitrust injury in order to bring a private cause of
action.242 Thus, only plaintiffs whose personal injuries are aligned
with the offense to the public goal of promoting competition are
eligible to recover treble damages. In contrast, courts construing
the FCA have determined that a qui tam plaintiff need not have suf-
fered any injury at all, either based on the reasoning that the
Government is the real party in interest, or based upon the view
that a qui tam plaintiff has a vested interest in recovery. 43 In securi-
ties class action suits, brought to enforce the laws that protect U.S.
financial markets from fraud, recent legislation has reduced the
239. See, e.g., James F. Barger, Jr. et al., States, Statutes and Fraud: An Empirical Study of
Emerging State False Claims Acts, 80 TUL. L. REV. 465,481 (2005).
240. See, e.g., The Clean WaterAct of 1977, 33 U.S.C. § 1251-1387 (1994).
241. See Thompson, supra note 2, at 205-09.
242. Brodley, supra note 3, at 16.
243. SeeJoan H. Krause, Health Care Providers and the Public Fisc: Paradigms of Government
Harm Under the Civil False Claims Act, 36 GA. L. REv. 121,148-52 (2001).
WINTER 2007]
University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform
independence of private attorneys and tied their interests to the
individual investors in the class they represent.2 4 For example, the
law now requires a lead plaintiff to be named, and discovery can-
not commence until after the initial pretrial motions have
concluded. 245 These reforms more closely align the interests of pri-
vate enforcers with the public goals of protecting the integrity of
U.S. capital markets.
The pharmaceutical cases reviewed above offer numerous ex-
amples of the moral hazard problem with privatized public
enforcement. Yet, these same inducement concerns, and questions
about the expense and efficacy of developing law under such con-
ditions, apply in other contexts as well-wherever the Government
is overwhelmed by private prosecutors under environmental, anti-
trust, securities, and other public law statutes. Therefore, the next
section explores ways to fix the moral hazard problem, by realign-
ing private enforcers' interests with public priorities in the FCA
context. However, the principles applied to suggest the following
FCA reform, may be useful in looking at ways to improve private
prosecution of public statutes generally.
IV. A PROPOSED SOLUTION: REVISING THE Qul TAM PROVISION
OF THE CIVIL FALSE CLAIMS ACT"46
The data empirically demonstrate the unquestionable trend to-
ward private enforcement of the FCA generally.24 In these
examples of public-private partnerships for enforcing the law, the
public enforcer is no longer leading the majority of FCA cases. The
trend is away from the Government's control over these federal
claims, and from the formation of the underlying law it used to
control. The most important cost imposed by this trend is the po-
tential compromise of the social objectives that public
enforcement is intended to serve. Where large financial payoffs
inure to the personal benefit of the private enforcer, there is a
244. See Joseph A. Grundfest & Michael A. Perino, The Pentium Papers: A Case Study of
Collective Institutional Investor Activism in Litigation, 38 ARIz. L. REv. 559, 559-62 (1996) (de-
scribing the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995).
245. Joseph A. Grundfest & Michael A. Perino, Securities Litigation Reform: The First Year's
Experience, in 1015 CORPORATE LAw & PRACTICE COURSE HANDBOOK SERIES, 955, 961-62
(1997), available at Westlaw, 1015 PLI/Corp 955.
246. Of significant concern, but beyond the scope of this Article, are the Constitutional
issues raised by qui tam relators prosecuting fraud under the FCA without adequate govern-
ment supervision. The U.S. Constitution's Appointments and "take care" clauses may be
sources of liability for inadequate supervision. See generaUy Bucy, supra note 16, at 955.
247. See supra Part.I.
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greater likelihood that private economic interests will lead plain-
tiffs to pursue claims that diverge from the public goals of a public
statute. Moreover, when a private plaintiff has the ability to pro-
ceed regardless of any meaningful quality control exercised by the
public enforcement authority, the result is a proliferation of law-
suits that may prove personally lucrative, but inconsistent with the
public purposes of the statutory scheme.
The pharmaceutical industry prosecutions provide numerous
examples of the issues raised by the privatization trend because
these lawsuits are being aggressively pursued to the fullest extent
that the FCA will allow. 4 These cases provide examples of a long
list of social costs imposed by overenforcement. The TAP Pharma-
ceutical litigation illustrates that weak cases will impose litigation
and enforcement costs not internalized by the private plaintiff. Set-
tied cases such as the Bayer Corporation private labeling case and
the Parke-Davis "off-labeling" cases will do little to advance the law
in a way that will predictably order future behavior. Excessive pri-
vate enforcement compromises the ability of administrative
agencies such as the FDA or the Department of Health and Hu-
man Services-charged with lawmaking and adjudicative authority
under a public law-to exercise prosecutorial discretion and make
use of complex procedural and substantive provisions to control
abuses under the statutes like the Anti-Kickback statute and the
FDCA. Overly lucrative financial incentives invite questionable
plaintiff practices such as the plaintiffs who appear repeatedly in
qui tam cases or plaintiffs who accept employment for short periods
of time before their employer becomes a target defendant. The
Parke-Davis litigation also illustrates that in cases where private en-
forcers advance novel interpretations of existing law, reliance on
courts as the primary vehicle for screening inappropriate theories
will inevitably lead to inconsistent interpretations of the law with-
out agency oversight and control in the broad range of cases filed.
The uncertainty that continues to surround the practice of off-
label marketing, for example, is made no better by the piecemeal
approach to litigation that private enforcement necessarily in-
volves. The danger of establishing bad legal precedent remains as
seen by the Merck-Medco,49 Genesis Healthy and Whiteside251 cases.
The conclusion of this analysis is that Congress must now act to
248. See FABRIKANT supra note 38, § 1.05.
249. United States ex rel. Hunt v. Merck-Medco Managed Care, L.L.C., 336 F. Supp. 2d
430 (E.D. Pa. 2004).
250. In 7e Genesis Health Ventures, Inc. v. Debtors, 272 B.R. 558 (D. Del. 2002).
251. United States v. Whiteside, 285 F.3d 1345 (11th Cir. 2002).
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reform the Civil False Claims Act, bringing it back in line with its
original objectives and reasonable limitations. The FCA should be
amended to reflect a lesson derived from moral hazard theory. In
the insurance law context, eliminating moral hazard occurs when
an insured is exposed to potential losses so that the presence of
insurance is less likely to increase unnecessary utilization or reduce
the exercise of reasonable caution.
Applying that principle here, the Government must be exposed
to the potential losses present in cases brought by qui tam relators.
This will create an incentive for the Government to monitor these
cases more closely and to more closely align the private enforcer's
interests with those of the public. Moreover, comparing the proce-
dural approaches to other public-private enforcement regimes also
suggests reform to the FCA statute that may return the Govern-
ment to a position of control in public enforcement, while not
compromising the benefits provided by private plaintiffs. The en-
forcement statutes that govern environmental citizen suits,
antitrust, and securities enforcement, all include procedural
mechanisms that operate to reduce the likelihood that a private
plaintiff will base the decision to prosecute solely on the potential
for private financial gain. 52 Whether it is the requirement to pay
recovered funds into the U.S. Treasury, judicially imposed standing
requirements, or class action reforms such as the requirement to
name a lead plaintiff, the lesson of other public-private regimes is
that private enforcers' interests must be legislatively subordinated
to the public good.
All these reform objectives would be served if Congress
amended the FCA statute to require the Government to evaluate
the underlying merits of all cases in which it permits qui tam rela-
tors to prosecute in its stead. This could be done by requiring the
Government to either join or move to dismiss each qui tam case
within a certain statutory time period."3 If the case is joined, the
Government may return to a "monitor only" approach, allowing it
252. See e.g., Meghrig v. KFC Western, Inc., 516 U.S. 479, 484 (1996) (explaining that
the citizen suit provisions in the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act allow a private
party bringing a waste clean-up suit to obtain injunctive relief but not damages for past
clean-up costs); Atlantic Richfield Co. v. USA Petroleum Co., 495 U.S. 328, 334 (1990) (ex-
plaining that a private plaintiff may not recover damages for showing a simple injury, but
must show the exact type of injury the antitrust statute was designed to prohibit); Ernst &
Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 193 (1976) (holding that a private cause of action for
damages will not arise without an allegation that the "sceinter" had the "intent to deceive,
manipulate, or defraud").
253. Proposals requiring the Government to join or dismiss a qui tam case have recently
been proposed in other contexts. See Aaron R. Petty, How Qui Tam Actions Could Fight Public
Corruption, 39 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 851 (2006) (proposing qui tam actions as a supplement
to federal prosecution of state and local public corruption).
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to multiply its enforcement efforts but only where worthwhile cases
are concerned. The full range of monitoring-choosing alternative
enforcement, settling, and dismissing these worthy cases-would
still be available to the Government. However, as a co-litigant, such
a rule would cause the Government to allow qui tam relators to take
over its leadership position of cases for which the Government's
demand is more inelastic than elastic. This would minimize the
moral hazard risk that the Government will rely upon the qui tam
relator to prosecute costly, frivolous claims. The legislative lan-
guage required to accomplish this reform is simple. The qui tam
section of the Civil False Claims Act5 4 could be amended to add
the italicized language and omit the bracketed language below:
(b) Actions by private persons.-
(1) A person may bring a civil action for a violation of
section 3729 for the person and for the United
States Government. The action shall be brought in
the name of the Government. The action may be
dismissed only if the court and the Attorney Gen-
eral give written consent to the dismissal and their
reasons for consenting.
(2) A copy of the complaint and written disclosure of
substantially all material evidence and information
the person possesses shall be served on the Gov-
ernment pursuant to Rule 4(d) (4) of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure. The complaint shall be
filed in camera, shall remain under seal for at least
60 days, and shall not be served on the defendant
until the court so orders. The Government may
elect to intervene and proceed with the action
within 60 days after it receives both the complaint
and the material evidence and information. The
Government may elect not to intervene but to allow the ac-
tion to proceed. In this case, the Government must certify
that it has evaluated the claim and, in accordance with
Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, deems the
case worthy to continue. The Government may elect to in-
tervene and proceed with a certified action at any time.
(3) The Government may, for good cause shown, move
the court for extensions of the time during which
254. 31 U.S.C § 3730(b).
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the complaint remains under seal under paragraph
(2). Any such motions may be supported by affida-
vits or other submissions in camera. The defendant
shall not be required to respond to any complaint
filed under this section until 20 days after the com-
plaint is unsealed and served upon the defendant
pursuant to Rule 4 of the Federal Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure.
(4) Before the expiration of the 60-day period or any
extensions obtained under paragraph (3), the Gov-
ernment shall-
(A) proceed with the action, in which case the ac-
tion shall be conducted by the Government; or
(B) notify the court that it declines to take over the
action, in which case the person bringing the
action shall have the right to conduct the ac-
tion.
(d) Award to qui tam plaintiff.-
(1) If the Government proceeds with an action brought
by a person under subsection (b), or if the Govern-
ment certifies an action to be conducted by a person under
subsection (b), such person shall, subject to the sec-
ond sentence of this paragraph, receive at least 15
percent but not more than [25] 30 percent of the
proceeds of the action or settlement of the claim,
depending upon the extent to which the person
substantially contributed to the prosecution of the
action ....
These minimal changes in the statute will address the problems
highlighted in this Article and demonstrated in the "real life" ex-
amples of several recently prosecuted pharmaceutical fraud cases.
Adopting the changes suggested above will insert into the FCA pro-
tections already contained or implied in the approach of other
statutes that employ private attorneys general for public law en-
forcement. Finally, the legislative reform this Article suggests
corrects the moral hazard problem contained in the current FCA
statutory structure. The Government would be placed once again
in a position of control with respect to all FCA prosecutions. The
Government will be responsible under the revised statute to cause
frivolous claims to be dismissed, to intervene in cases requiring the
Government's prosecutorial leadership, or to certify cases that pro-
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ceed under the direction of qui tam relators independently, have
merit, and will serve the public good. The FCA reform proposed
would reverse the unchecked trend toward private parties' domi-
nance in public enforcement, and reverse the unacceptably large
social costs privatization imposes on society, and return the Civil
False Claims Act to its original design to serve the public goals and
achieve benefits that private-public enforcement is intended to
protect.
CONCLUSION
Overenforcement by zealous "private attorneys general" has
been a concern for decades. The seminal literature on joint public-
private enforcement abounds with examples. When advancing her
proposal to deputize private citizens to enforce civil rights statutes
in police brutality cases, Professor Myriam Gilles counseled the
need to limit private enforcement actions to those actually injured
because such a limitation "promotes manageability and insulates
the Justice Department from a potential onslaught of meritless or
vexatious petitions." '55 Professor Frank Cross, in his article that is
generally critical of citizen suits brought to enforce environmental
statutes, found common ground with Professor Barton Thompson
when it came to the potential dangers of excesses and overdeter-
rence, 256 though the latter wrote to champion not only private
prosecutorial efforts, but also the role of private parties as monitors
and informants under the environmental regulatory scheme.
2 57
Even Professor Thompson admitted that where private agencies
bring suits the Government would not, these actions create the po-
tential for overenforcement, which Professor Thompson calls
"added zealousness error.2 58 Private enforcers play a key role in
promoting the socially beneficial goals that underlie the antitrust
laws.25 9 And yet, after noting that private remedies such as treble
and punitive damages are "exceptionally powerful,"2 Joseph Brod-
ley wrote that "private enforcers, driven by their own self-interest,
255. Gilles, supra note 1, at 1432.
256. Frank B. Cross, Rethinking Environmental Citizen Suits, 8 TEMP. ENVTL. L. & TECH. J.
55, 68-69 (1989).
257. Thompson, supra note 2, at 185-88.
258. Id. at 201. Thompson also claims to have evidence of underenforcement by private
agencies, where the private enforcers fail to bring suits that would benefit the common
good. Id. at 199-203.
259. Brodley, supra note 3, at 1.
260. Id. at 11.
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may deviate from antitrust goals, and the strong penalties and
litigation advantages available to private litigants magnify the mis-
chief such litigation may cause."26" Joseph A. Gunderfest wrote to
urge the Securities and Exchange Commission to administratively
limit implied private securities class actions on the grounds that in
their effort to enforce the investor protection goals of the federal
securities laws, private class action litigants
may therefore do much more than simply supplement federal
enforcement efforts by bringing more of the same type of
cases that the government would bring if it had the resources.
In particular, private parties may pursue cases that the gov-
ernment would refuse to bring even it [sic] had infinite
262resources.
All of these astute commentators have readily acknowledged the
proposition that excessive and unsupervised private enforcement
may compromise important social goals. After all, the statutes that
permit the use of private enforcers to supplement Government
prosecution, whether expressly or implicitly, enlist the aid of pri-
vate enforcers in the pursuit of lofty social priorities. However, no
one has empirically confirmed that when left to their own devices,
private attorneys general will seek to serve their own personal in-
terests, regardless of the impact they may have on the public good.
This Article demonstrates the overwhelming impact of a "real
life" example of the divergence between private and public inter-
ests.2 63 It offers the theory of moral hazard as an explanation for
that divergence in the particular instance of qui tanm 64 litigation.
Finally, based on the root incentives that cause the divergence, the
Article offers a proposal to close the gap between the motivations
that drive private and public enforcers. The lessons learned herein
will, I believe, reverse the harms currently being visited upon the
social good by excessive and excessively independent qui tam en-
forcement of the FCA. Moreover, as legal scholars look to broaden
the public-private partnership described by the qui tam section of
261. Id. at 15.
262. Grundfest, supra note 4, at 970. Grundfest also observed that the converse is true;
private plaintiffs may fail to bring cases under the federal securities law that the government
would pursue if it had the resources. Id.
263. Notably, J. Randy Beck has traced accounts of actual qui tam abuses that occurred
in English legal history from before the American Revolution until Parliament abolished the
tool in the mid-twentieth century. J. Randy Beck, The False Claims Act and the English Eradica-
tion of Qui Tam Legislation, 78 N.C. L. Rav. 539 (2000).
264. See supra note 9.
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the FCA,265 these reforms will limit the chance that moral hazard
problems will be exported broadly. Finally, the ideas presented
here may also be applied to inform the public and private en-
forcement concerns that arise under securities class action
enforcement, private antitrust actions, civil rights litigation, and
citizen suits brought to force compliance with environmental laws
and regulations.
265. See, e.g., Bucy, supra note 42, (advocating expansion of a reformed version of the
qui tam model to introduce private enforcement in protecting the environment and finan-
cial markets); see alsoJill E. Fisch, Class Action Reform, Qui Tam, and the Role of the Plaintiff LAW
& CONTEMP. PROBS., Autumn 1997, at 167, 198-202 (suggesting the qui tam "enforcement
partnership" as a way to reform class action lawsuits to enforce securities law).
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